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ABSTRACT 
 
COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT IN A COOPERATIVE: 
PROBLEMATIZING PRODUCTIVITY AND POWER 
 
by 
 
 
Avery Edenfield 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016 
Under the Supervision of Professor Dave Clark 
 
Since the mid-twentieth century, the structure of the workplace has undergone a 
transformation. While the conventional firm with its rigid bureaucracies is still in use, many 
businesses have grown increasingly flexible, flat, and polycentric: “empowerment” and 
“innovation” are the coin of the realm. As the way we work changed, professional 
communication scholarship pivoted to consider communication practices in these structures.  
While professional communication scholars have long discussed these kinds of 
organizations, they have not discussed an increasingly popular alternative: cooperatives. Owned 
and operated by the people who use them, these organizations can significantly affect the 
communities in which they operate. To contribute to the rhetorical knowledge of cooperatives, I 
conducted a qualitative study at the Riverwest Public House Cooperative (“Public House”). This 
project extends research of flat organizations by investigating a cooperative business. I draw my 
research questions from the concerns scholars identified in other kinds of organizations: namely, 
the role of genres in configuring power and facilitating organizational change (Clark 2006; 
Devitt 1991; Spinuzzi 2007; Star 1991; Winsor 2003; Zachry 2000).  
1. How does a cooperative employ genres differently?  
2. What do these texts tell us about how power is distributed in a cooperative?  
3. How do the genres it employs affect organizational change?  
iii 
These questions helped me better understand the connections between negotiations of power and 
texts at work in this particular business, leading me to several findings:  
1. Genres. Collaboratively produced texts are the backbone of consensus-based decision-
making. Unlike conventional organizations, in a cooperative, many (though not all) 
stakeholders are given access to governance. For instance, documents like an incident 
report or safer space policy have greater social significance when they are not only 
produced by agreement but also enforced through agreement.  
2. Organizational Change. The Public House underwent a managerial overhaul during my 
study. Like conventional businesses, change occurred through a confluence of material 
circumstances and individual and organizational goals; however, due to the absence of 
formal structure, in this instance, a broader range of individuals was able to institute 
structural change.  
3. Distribution of Power. In place of hierarchy, rhetorics of empowerment and democracy 
were deployed horizontally to task employees with managerial duties without financial 
rewards.  
For this project, I provide an interdisciplinary take on hierarchy and organizational structure by 
examining one cooperative, still in its infancy, through the lens of genre and power in the 
workplace.  
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Chapter 1: Cooperatives, Collective Management, and Hierarchy: 
Rationale and Relevance for Study 
Vignette 1: Jamal has worked for two years as the lead bartender for the Workers’ Collective, 
the committee of workers who democratically manage the bar. After starting school, he finds he 
is overwhelmed and decides to step down. The bar operates fine without a lead bartender for a 
few months, but soon maintenance tasks start to fall through the cracks, scheduling gaps occur, 
and inventory and finance officers operate without input from the group. The Board of Directors 
gives the Workers’ Collective a deadline to decide how they will manage themselves. At the next 
workers’ meeting, the Collective revisits the job description of the lead bartender, paring down 
the description to fit the bar’s current needs, and then makes changes in Google Docs. They 
agree one person could perform the tasks—most of what was previously performed by Jamal. 
The workers decide to revisit the decisions they have made in two weeks, then three months, and 
then one year. Finally, one worker nominates another for the position. After it is seconded, a vote 
is taken. The nominee is brought back into the room and congratulated on her new position as 
lead bartender.  
Vignette 2: After a year in the same position, Liz believes she deserves a raise. After consulting 
with co-workers, she pitches her own wage hike at a policy session of the Workers’ Collective. 
In the meeting, Liz begins by drawing attention to the shared ethic of fair wages and valued 
labor, reminding the group that her experience should bring higher pay. She points out her 
dedication and dependability, closing her case by suggesting she take on additional duties. After 
discussion, the group votes in favor of the wage hike for the position in general and a raise 
specific for Liz, with the addition of the extra duties she suggested. 
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Introduction 
 With over 3,000 members and a hundred active volunteers, the Riverwest Co-op and Café 
has operated in the Riverwest neighborhood of Milwaukee, Wisconsin for 13 years, relying 
almost completely on volunteer labor (riverwestcoop.org/about/history). Volunteers stock 
products, run the register, clean, and complete many necessary tasks around the grocery store. In 
return, volunteers receive a free meal in the café and a discount in the grocery store. Each year, 
hundreds of volunteers flood the cooperative to help with completing inventory.  
 In the same neighborhood, participants in the Riverwest24 (riverwest24.com), a leaderless, 
cooperatively organized annual bicycle race, complete a five-mile loop between houses and 
businesses on busy city streets. It is completely volunteer run, from organizing volunteers and 
event details, designing the website, tracking laps and checkpoints both digitally and manually, 
cooking and washing dishes (no paper plates or plastic ware!) for nearly a thousand people, and 
cleaning up the city blocks after the race. If organizations like these examples operate 
cooperatively, does it change the nature of their work? How does a neighborhood cooperative 
come into existence in the first place and what can we learn about the way they write their 
documentation together, work together, and solve problems together?  
 Evident in these stories, cooperatives can fundamentally drive a local economy.1 What the 
above observations demonstrate is cooperation and collaboration as “business.” Each of these 
success stories of cooperation functions by collective management: management by a group of 
workers or volunteers, rather than a general manager. I argue this success may problematize what 
we think we know about organizational structure and the role of hierarchy.  
                                                 
 
 
1 A cooperative is an ownership model. A collective is a management model.  
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 In the past, professional communication scholarship often assumed an organization marked 
by hierarchy and bureaucracy; however, as new technologies have changed the way we work, 
scholarship has shifted toward investigating flatter, more autonomous work in the form of teams 
or networked organizations. Scholars like Spinuzzi, Clark, and Winsor have found correlations 
and dissimilarities between the models in the way power and communication works, arguing 
power and relationships extend beyond the top-down structure (Spinuzzi 2007, 2014; Winsor 
2001; Zachry 2000; Zuboff 1988). In doing so, scholars have identified that even within an 
apparently hierarchical structure, communication and power are more omnidirectional than they 
may appear at first (Winsor 2003). In their research, they have unveiled the many means by 
which horizontal organizations may enact subordinating configurations of power through 
management mechanisms (Clark 2006; Longo 2000; Spinuzzi 2007; Sussman, Adams, Kuzmits, 
and Raho 2002; Winsor 1996, 2003; Zuboff 2006). Scholarship suggests flat organizations may 
enact power differently, in large part through genres, and may fall short of actualizing goals of 
workplace autonomy.   
 Researchers have studied the flow of information through an organization as it is channeled 
to affirm and reinforce the extant power structure of the superior-subordinate relationship 
(Fragale, Sumanth, Tiedens, and Northcraft 2012; Longo 2000; Sussman et al. 2002; Winsor 
1996, 2003). For example, in Spurious Coin, Longo deploys Foucauldian concepts of discipline 
and panoptic oversight as a point of inquiry for a top-down structure, arguing hierarchal 
management ensures—and relies on—subordinate discipline and an internalization of rules 
(2000). Relying on the same work by Foucault in Writing Power, Winsor analyzes the role of 
genres in shaping and maintaining these structures of control, noting genres play a major role in 
defining a hierarchy within an organization (1996, 2003). Similarly, Zachry’s historical 
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examination of genres rests on a history of downward communication (2000). For instance, he 
points out stable genres developed at the Rath Packing Plant exert control; peoples’ work 
activities, identities, and positions within the company were dictated in part by genres supporting 
a bureaucratic hierarchy (65, 66, 68). Clark extends Bourdieu’s notion of capital to analyze 
narratives of empowerment and the regulation of hierarchies, observing these narratives are too 
often about employee bribes for doing more work with little reward, financial or otherwise 
(2006).  
 While these scholars carefully examine configurations of power in an organization, many 
take the presence of a hierarchy for granted. Tim Kastelle, professor of innovation at the 
University of Queensland Business School, recently wrote that among organization and business 
researchers, there is an underlying assumption that a hierarchy is necessary, and, therefore, many 
businesses and university business programs teach with the following assumptions.  
 You need a hierarchy to succeed. 
 The people who do the work are of lower status than those who decide what work to do. 
 Organizations that do not follow the norms are likely to fail (Kastelle 2013; see also 
Rinehart 2006).  
Furthermore, Kastelle identified challenges to making the case for the need for non-hierarchical 
businesses.  
 Many people do not believe in democracy in the workplace.   
 Even if you do believe in democracy, it can be hard to imagine work without hierarchy.   
 People fear the unusual.  
 It is hard to change organizational structures (Kastelle 2013).  
Despite the fact that many still believe hierarchy is important, and alongside the current trends 
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toward polycentric, flat businesses, for the past two centuries, cooperatives have challenged this 
unequal distribution of power and are currently experiencing a significant boom, supported by 
local and federal governments, university researchers, and urban and rural development 
programs (Dewan 2014; Restakis 2010). I aim to extend professional communication research of 
flat, flexible organizations by including cooperatives. I believe it is important to do so because 
cooperatives can provide a clear contrast between organizations that claim autonomy and 
empowerment while structurally maintaining hierarchy, and those who try to enact it.   
 
Conventional Business  
Hard pressed to envision any realistic alternative, most people accepted these rules and the 
hierarchical distinctions they entailed. In this way managers and workers, fitfully, kept the faith.  
-Shoshana Zuboff 
 
 While Winsor, Spinuzzi, Zachry, Clark, and others have done much to unveil the 
complexities and contradictions in hierarchical, command-and-control organizations and to 
respond to the shifting nature of work, collective management that is deliberately democratic has 
yet to be substantially studied by professional communication. Nevertheless, this research is 
valuable because, at least in part, this type of organization responds to the failures and criticisms 
against conventional firms. This section provides an interdisciplinary literary review of hierarchy 
in business management and points out important contrasts to a cooperative. 
 Fragle et al. begin their study of structure and communication with this useful definition of 
hierarchy: 
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Hierarchy—the unequal distribution of status and power among individuals in a 
collective—is a defining feature of organizations (Pfeffer 1992; Leavitt 2005; 
Mannix and Sauer 2006; Magee and Galinsky 2008; Gruenfeld and Tiedens 
2010). Individuals’ desires to gain status and power through hierarchical 
advancement are often characterized as fundamental human motives (Winter 
1973; McClelland 1975). In any given group hierarchy, individuals generally wish 
to move toward the top, where the greatest power and status reside. (Fragle et al. 
373) 
Echoing Kastalle’s claims of its ubiquity, Fragle et al. position hierarchy as a fundamental 
feature of organizations, and the desire to move up the hierarchy as a fundamental human desire.  
 Taylorism has become the reigning metaphor for bureaucracy and command-and-control, 
the rationalization of work through scientific study and management. Its philosophy is 
inextricable from today’s version of post-industrial capitalism and modern management 
strategies (Murphy 2011; Rinehart 2006). Kastelle, Zuboff, and others have pointed out 
hierarchy remains deeply ingrained in the way we think about doing business, bolstered in part 
by its entrenchment in the curriculum of business schools (Kastelle 2013; Clark 156; Zuboff 
233). Taylor arguably made a lasting contribution to American management in the measurement 
and rationalization of work in two meaningful ways: first, by breaking labor into smaller tasks; 
secondly, by extracting and displacing the knowledge of the labor process from the employee to 
the supervisor, decoupling idiosyncratic know-how from the laborer. In this way, conventional 
businesses are easily recognizable by asymmetrical bureaucracy based fundamentally on the 
concepts of ownership (Zuboff 225).  
 
7 
 Importantly, rationalization is one of the lasting impacts of Taylorism in American 
management. Zuboff writes rationalization “was transformative upon American managers and 
their claims to authority. They learned… that the interior of the labor process had to be 
penetrated, explicated, and rationalized” (230). Rationalization of labor relies on the panoptic 
gaze of the manager upon the managed. This shift from workers owning their work habits and 
managing their labor, to management owning the labor and, during the time of employment, the 
laborer, is the root of Taylorist power (Zuboff 1996; Rinehart 2006). 
 This top-down structure is one of the most fundamental differences between conventional 
and collective management; namely, mechanisms were designed to exact the most from an 
employee in the most efficient way for the maximum profits to the investors/owners and 
maximum benefit for the worker (Drucker 1987; Longo 2000; Rinehart 2006; Zuboff 1988). 
Taylor himself describes the design as focused solely on mutual prosperity. 
The principle object of management should be to secure the maximum prosperity 
for the employer, coupled with the maximum prosperity for each employee… 
maximum prosperity for each employee means not only higher wages than are 
usually received by men of his class, but of more importance still, it also means 
the development of each man to his state of maximum efficiency…(10-11)   
The scientific management system methodically rationalized labor, seeking to maximize profit 
and efficiency to benefit both the employee and employer (Drucker 1988; Longo 2000; Taylor 
1911). Unlike cooperatives, which define themselves as balancing between profit and 
community development, Taylorism and approaches like it emphasize profit as the primary 
motivation for the worker, manager, and investor. Taylor’s scientific management “provides the 
ultimate rationale for managerial authority” (Zuboff 230).  
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Surveillance and Control 
 Rationalization of labor depends in part on observation and surveillance (i.e., the 
manager’s gaze). Longo deploys the Foucauldian concept of panoptic oversight and discipline as 
a point of inquiry for the conventional firm. Like Zuboff, Longo argues hierarchal management 
ensures subordinate discipline and an internalization of rules, and that hierarchical management 
is rooted in regulating labor (2000). Like Drucker and others, Longo links the beginnings of 
management as a control system like Taylorism with the rise of scientism and engineering. Due 
to the evolution of engineering in large, complex organizations, engineers were tasked with 
designing social systems along with the mechanical systems of production and operation.   
These designs for social control were termed, ‘management systems’…As 
engineers designed management systems to make workers as efficient as the 
machines with which they worked, they also designed intricate technical 
communication systems as the mechanisms for effecting operations control for 
maximum efficiency. (79)  
These systems of control and discipline “worked to make an organization’s production more 
efficient by measuring each worker’s performance and comparing it to pre-established 
performance and quality standards,” standards developed by Taylorists (Longo 79; Rinehart 
2006; Taylor 1911; Zuboff 1988). Longo and Winsor have both pointed out that the ongoing 
examination for and correction of deviance from standards, the soul of American management, is 
a Foucauldian “normalizing gaze” (Longo 80; Winsor Writing Power 7). This oversight strips 
workers of previously held idiosyncratic judgments and decision-making power on how work 
should be done, how intensely they work and when, and how to manage their time. In a sense, 
Taylorism is a response to previously held autonomous power by the laborers and an attempt to 
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seize control of worker’s labor from the worker to the overseer.  
 Rinehart identifies Marxist ideas of alienation and worker discontent as reactionary to these 
systems of command and control (12).  In a nod to worker management in the past, Longo, 
Rinehart, and Zuboff draw a stark contrast from the standardization, control, and fragmentation 
of workers from each other into disparate parts of a machine, against the previous guild-type of 
management structure. Longo writes: 
This type of measuring and comparing viewed workers as individual units of 
production, not as members of collectives such as crews, gangs, or guilds as they 
were formally conceptualized… This function of measuring and comparing 
individual performance against standards for production and quality allowed 
systematized management to operate through constant examination of machines 
and workers. (79; See also Foucault 1975; Zuboff 1988) 
Winsor found similar viewpoints of worker-as-machine, pointing out how technicians were 
viewed as mechanisms, designed to work as efficiently as possible (2007).  
 Panoptic oversight at the core of hierarchal management facilitates “the penetration of 
regulation into even the smallest details of work within in the systematically managed 
operation,” stripping away shop workers’ decision-making power; Longo writes, “written 
operation standards dictated in detail the most efficient ways to do their work” (Longo 80, 198). 
Rinehart also references the stripping of idiosyncratic judgments as key to managing and 
controlling the labor process and, consequently, the laborer.  
Just as workers must give up their capacity to control the product of their toil, 
they also cede their ability to determine the intensity and duration of work; to 
define the manner in which work is organized, divided and allocated; and to 
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determine the tools and machines used in the production process. Furthermore, it 
is the employer who decides whether or not work will be performed at all. (12)   
Dissimilarly, a worker cooperative or collective emphasizes the value of labor and the self-
interest of the laborer contrasts sharply with a workers’ lack of autonomy (Polletta 183). 
Rinehart and others argue the current worker cooperative style of management we have owes its 
existence to a reaction against dehumanization and bureaucracy, the search and elimination of 
any deviance from efficiency standards (Rinehart 2006; Williams 2007).  
 Workers have been encouraged to surveil each other since the emergence of scientific 
management (Billeaux et al. 2011; Rosenthal 2013; Longo 2000; Zuboff 1988). In fact, mutual 
policing is essential to management, the key factor that separates management from the shop, the 
field, or the sales floor. For workers to report on each other, they must first see themselves as 
unassociated with one another, and then must have “internalized the control system and its 
standards for behavior before they can be motivated to report abnormal behaviors on the part of 
other workers” (81). This progressive fragmentation of labor and individualization of workers 
functions not only to micromanage tasks but also to divide and conquer, a strategy designed to 
encourage workers to see themselves as isolated individuals who were rewarded or punished 
apart from one another (Longo 81, 128).  
 One mechanism of panoptic oversight ensuring internalization of the rules is the affinity 
between the worker and the manager, whereas the worker can now take place in her own 
regulation. Though there was some resistance by labor unions and other labor organizing efforts 
(Longo 2000; Rinehart 2006; Zuboff 1988), Longo argues workers were further divided from 
each other by efforts to “transcend the hierarchal control” and, ultimately, to report on each 
other. Fortified by the religion of the American dream of success and consumerism (Murphy 
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2011; Williams 2007; Zuboff 1988), by the religious piety of the protestant work ethic (Zuboff 
1988), and by the religion of authority (Zuboff 1988; Arendt 1961), workers participated in their 
own regulation.  
 Hierarchical management depends in part on what Arendt calls the spiritual dimension of 
power, together rendering constant external surveillance unnecessary “in the smoothly running 
panoptic system” (Arendt 1961; Longo 81). Longo, Zuboff, and Rinehart argue the protestant 
work ethic undergirds the notion of hierarchy as obedience to “God’s natural law.” Protestant 
asceticism contributed to religious and social notions of hierarchy as “God’s natural order” 
(Zuboff 225). Eventually a reliance on “God’s law” was replaced with concepts of ownership, 
hard work, and entrepreneurship (Longo 2000; Rinehart 2006; Zuboff 1988). According to 
Zuboff, the emerging belief became that due to his hard work, the entrepreneur was rewarded by 
the system with success, “achieving grace,” and, most importantly, this success was available to 
anyone willing to exert the right amount of disciplined effort (226).   
 The promise of “grace” in the form of upward mobility and increased capital maximized 
consent of the workers. Zuboff writes, “These currents of feudal piety, Lockean individualism, 
Social Darwinism, and economic pragmatism animate U.S. labor law even as they inform the 
daily experiences of managers and workers” (Zuboff 238). Panoptic discipline—penetrating the 
minutia of labor—and other mechanisms of control are lynchpins of this form of hierarchical 
management. Longo, Rinehart, and Zuboff demonstrate when workers complained that this 
system was dehumanizing, managers often argued that this system of control was “natural,” and 
an inevitable relationship,” appealing to natural law (Longo 2000; Zuboff 1988; Arendt 1961). 
Drawing from Weber, Locke, Smith, and Arendt, Zuboff describes the connection between 
obedience, control, and hierarchy as fundamentally and historically infused with spiritual values 
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as a way of ensuring obedience.  
Since authority presupposes the unity of command and obedience, the use of 
coercive power implies that, to some degree, authority has failed. Similarly, 
authority can be defined in contradistinction to persuasion and dialogue, since 
obedience to authority is achieved through a belief in the hierarchical order that 
creates the mutuality of command and obedience. Legitimate authority need not 
depend on violence or reasoned argument to elicit the desired action. (221) 
Like Arendt, Zuboff contends authority is the “spiritual dimension of power” that depends on 
faith in a meaning system that “decrees the necessity of the hierarchical order,” (222) and 
requires “the collective participation in a system of meaning that goes beyond the immediate 
context, those who command or obey, and reaches into the domain of transcendent values…” 
(222). The “meaning” of the system comes to resemble a natural order; Zuboff writes, “The 
hierarchical order is meaningful and acceptable as long as people believe that such ranking rules 
reflect a higher order of moral necessity” (222). Echoing Kastelle’s claims, Zuboff challenges 
the seemingly innocuous, natural role hierarchy plays in our workplaces.  
 
Genre of Control 
 While Zuboff challenges the naturalizing of hierarchy in American businesses, in Writing 
Power, Winsor studies the role of genre in upholding such asymmetrical power relations. 
Winsor’s analysis of genre builds off Longo’s and Foucault’s research on power and discipline, 
and describes the role of genres as shaping and maintaining relationships of subordination and 
power (1996, 2003). Resonant with Arendt and Zuboff, she writes:  
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Management was not a brute assertion of power. Rather, managers worked at least 
partly through controlling representations: they created representations of their 
own decisions and plans that were addressed to workers, and they required 
workers to create regulated representations of their activity that managers could 
use in decision making. Regulating through institutionalized representations 
meant that they were able to embed management concerns into the culture and 
practices of the organization itself so that most members engaged in carrying 
them out even without direct supervision from a manager. (52)  
For Winsor, surveillance and discipline are embedded in organizational culture in part through 
representations. Just as Winner, Rinehart, and Longo point to the use of technology as 
mechanisms of control, Winsor demonstrates how organizations institute genres to preserve a 
hierarchy. Importantly, in such a structure, genres are created, institutionalized, and then 
functioned as gatekeepers of access and hierarchy over time. Drawing on Foucault, Giddons, 
Latour, Miller, and Longo, Winsor demonstrates it is within complex networks where genres 
take shape and then, conversely, shape the workflow through asymmetrical power relations.  
Organizations tend to institutionalize genres that reinforce existing power 
relationships so that not all the writing people do is equally likely to be 
recognized as part of an organizational genre… Also, in their institutionalized 
form, organizational genres are not equally available to everyone in an 
organization. Rather, they become resources only for those who are authorized to 
use them. (Writing Power 10) 
Winsor fuses Miller’s definition of genre as social action where genres “represent a confluence 
of the creation of knowledge and the enactment of power” (Writing Power 16), with a 
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Foucauldian understanding of power as “…not a quality that anyone can ‘hold’ but a relationship 
that is always locally generated using means that include, but are not limited to, positions in a 
hierarchy….” (7). Control of representations is symbolic power.  
 This confluence of symbolic power and knowledge creation is similarly important in non-
hierarchical business. In a collective, genres are essential stabilizing tools, keystones of 
collaboration, coordinated action, and deliberation (Winsor 2007). These boundary objects are 
points of agreement between disparate communities and, due in part to inevitable turnover, shape 
an organization over time (Star 1989). Devitt, Winsor, and Miller have shown genres are a 
stabilizing force (Devitt 1991; Miller 1984; Winsor 2007).  
 If, as Miller and others posit, genres are typified responses to typified social situations, 
genericised textual responses to a recurring situation, then understanding the social situations 
genres respond to is key to investigating networks of power in an organization (Miller 1984; 
Spinuzzi 2007; Winsor 2003), especially an organization that is as conscious of power relations 
as flat, flexible organizations.   
 
 
Flat and Non-hierarchical Organizations 
 In the last three decades, business and organizational researchers have studied the 
complexities and challenges of flat arrangements (Bosley 1991; Clark 2006; Conklin 2007; 
Drucker 1988; Gee, Hull, and Lankshear 1996; Johnson-Eilola 1996; Kastelle 2013; Leenders, 
van Engelen, and Kratzer 2003; Spinuzzi 2008, 2013, 2015; Star 1995; Waterman Jr. 1990; 
Williams 2007; Zuboff 1988). In a polycentric structure, each unit is specialized and virtually 
autonomous, reporting to the top while a centralized authority governs operations (Drucker 1987; 
Longo 2000; Winsor 2001; Zuboff 1988). These “flat structures” are less hierarchical, though not 
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necessarily more democratic, than conventional businesses (Drucker 1988; Williams 2007; 
Zuboff 1988). Drucker differentiates between command-and-control management styles like 
Taylorism from flat or “knowledge-based” management styles (3). Drucker points to the 
hospital, the symphony, or the British civic system in colonized India as examples of 
organizations functioning more or less horizontally, outside of the command-and-control style of 
traditional business (3): each unit is specialized and virtually autonomous, reporting to the top 
(5-6).  
 In his essay on flat structures, Drucker identifies four main issues with this type of 
management, issues that collective and cooperative management may also face.   
1.  Developing rewards, recognition, and career opportunities for specialists.  
2.  Creating a unified vision in an organization of specialists. 
3.  Devising the management structure for an organization of task forces. 
4.  Ensuring the supply, preparation, and testing of top management people. (8) 
A flat structure does not necessarily mean a business is democratically controlled. It can still be 
autocratic with a central, single key player (Drucker 1987; Zuboff 1988).  
 Recent scholarship has taken up the concern of how this shift from top-down, command-
and-control to team-based, decentralized work affects employee empowerment and agency 
(Clark 2006; Johnson-Eilola 1996; Spinuzzi 2013, 2014, 2015; Wilson 2001). With what they 
have termed “new capitalism,” Gee, Hull, and Lankshear summarize this shift in work 
organization with four points.  
1.  Productivity is based on knowledge, science, and technology. 
2.  Information and knowledge process are dominant, key activities for multinational 
businesses. 
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3.  Companies are organized in radically different ways emphasizing flatter organizations, 
fewer levels of hierarchy, more cooperation, and flexible employees. 
4.  Competition and the market are now global and focused solely on rapidly fulfilling each 
individual customer’s needs. (36-42) 
However, Gee, Hull, and Lankshear argue employee agency under new capitalism is not 
empowerment at all. According to Faber’s summary of their studies,  
[They] argue that the rhetoric of new capitalism is “insulting to workers” despite 
its desire for fully informed and participatory employees. Although change 
projects… talk about empowered workers, information sharing, critical (outside-
of-the-box) thinking, and creative expression, employees cannot actually engage 
in such behavior if the consequences are detrimental to the organization. The 
employees only have agency insofar as this agency acts in the interests of the 
company. (64-65) 
While the language of new capitalism emphasizes empowerment and creativity, employees are 
constrained by the interests of the company. This creates a paradox between self-management 
and oversight: while promoting autonomy, creativity, and self-management, employees must 
internalize the ethos of the company to know where those limits are. Gee, Hull, and Lankshear 
write:  
[T]he newly empowered and newly “critical thinking” workers cannot really 
question the goals, visions, and values that define the very parameters of the new 
capitalist business... The worker’s “freedom” is fixed within the margins of the 
goals, ends, and vision set by the new capitalism and its theoreticians. The 
problem can be put another way: real commitment and belief… require that 
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learners be able to engage in genuine dialogue and contestation with viewpoints, 
but such genuine contestation is ultimately problematic in a business setting 
where, in the end, profit is the goal and the competition is at one’s heels. (qt. in 
Faber 65) 
Faber, Gee, Hull, Lankshear, and others argue new capitalism calls for a deeper level of 
investment shrouded in the language of democracy, but without the rewards (Clark 2006). Faber 
best sums up the contradiction between the language of new capitalism and actualization of 
employee agency: “Despite the claims of employee agency and accountability, the same 
dominant structures continue to rule the global playing field” (66). While they analyze the 
structures that enable and support inequity, they do not go so far as to take up other kinds of 
structures like cooperatives as alternatives that try to attain a business without inequity. 
 There are several shapes to flat arrangements of a workplace with a range of political 
commitments, each based on principles of autonomy and collaboration. Here, I focus on the 
network and its variants, comparing three types of organizations, broadly defined, along a 
spectrum of managerial oversight, from adhocracies to anarcho-syndicalism. While cooperatives 
may incorporate these arrangements, these examples are not cooperative per se as the defining 
feature of a cooperative is shared ownership and voluntary participation.    
 
Adhocracy 
 Adhocracy is a way of structuring around small ad hoc teams, rejecting or blending 
“bureaucracy,” and “cutting through organization charters, departments, functions, job 
descriptions, hierarchy, and tradition” (Waterman Jr. 16). Waterman Jr. writes that ad hoc work 
groups can bring breakthroughs, creativity, and innovational problem solving when traditional 
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channels have failed. Creating a space theoretically outside hierarchical leadership roles of the 
organization, an ad hoc team purportedly levels the playing field in an effort to bring new ideas 
to the table (Waterman Jr. 1990). Waterman Jr. notes adhocracies often operate alongside 
bureaucracies, and are reactions to the stultifying effects of these bureaucracies, which he argues 
can inhibit change (17). In contrast, adhocracies are flexible. On the nature of bureaucracy, 
Waterman Jr. writes:  
Structured work drives out the unstructured; that’s almost the law of nature. The 
nature of adhocracy is both unstructured and very important, whereas the nature 
of bureaucracy is transfixed by structure and trivia. Because the structured 
organization takes precedence, opportunities get missed, crucial issues go 
unresolved, and efforts to change usually get nipped in the bud. (97) 
Spinuzzi recently updated the concept of adhocracy to the all-edge adhocracy, which he 
describes as networked organizations characterized by “flat structure, changing composition, 
flexibility, and adaptability” (Spinuzzi 2013). According to Spinuzzi, the 1970s were 
characterized by bureaucracies, the 1990s by adhocracies, but the 2010s by all-edge adhocracies, 
ad hoc teams that are autonomous and allow for innovation (Spinuzzi 2013).  
 According to Waterman Jr., adhocracy co-exists alongside bureaucracy as they meet 
different needs of the organization. Bureaucracies stabilize while adhocracies innovate 
(Waterman Jr. 87). Cooperatives or conventional businesses may utilize ad hoc teams in their 
structure. Adhocracies themselves are not necessarily democratic or liberating, but can be 
incorporated into many kinds of structures.  
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Co-management 
 In organizations that practice worker self-management, bureaucracy may be rejected 
altogether in favor of autonomous teams completely outside of explicit hierarchy, disregarding 
social hierarchies that may develop. Recalling Jamal’s replacement through vote in Vignette #1, 
in an interview with the BBC, Alcides Rivero describes the sweeping rejection of hierarchy at 
one of Venezuela’s government-owned aluminum plants entirely co-managed by the employees: 
“It’s us, the workers, who decide on questions of production and technology, and it’s us who 
elect who will be our managers,” (Bruce 2005). At the same plant, a member from the personnel 
department, Marivit Lopez, draws attention to the budgeting process as all-hands-in: “The 
different departmental works councils are discussing and amending the existing proposal so that 
we get a budget that really fits the company’s needs” (Bruce 2005). Lopez points to worker-
focused polycentric management: each autonomous team works together to benefit themselves 
and the company. Like Waterman Jr.’s ad hoc groups, these teams cut across organizational lines 
and allow for innovation. However, in this scenario, this organization does not qualify as a 
cooperative because ownership of the company rests with the state rather than the workers 
themselves.  
 
Anarcho-syndicalism 
 At the end of the continuum of team-based, flat organizations is a post-capitalist model: 
anarcho-syndicalism. IIFOR defines anarchism as “coordination on equal footing, without 
superiors and subordinates” (“Horizontal Organization: A Brief Study”). Anarchism, broadly 
defined, is a rejection of rule, particularly managerial rule. Anarcho-syndicalism is an anti-
capitalist philosophy of worker ownership rooted in unionism and total self-management. 
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Duncombe describes anarchy as “a close abstraction of the network: voluntary, nonhierarchical, 
with omnidirectional communication flows, and each citizen a creator/consumer” (Duncombe 
188, qt. Farmer 50) and the modes of communication embody this philosophy. In his analysis of 
textual production in this framework, Farmer writes these networks represent “the merging of 
organic democratic participation with organic economic and cultural production” (51). Anarchic 
organizations are flat with each actor autonomous and independent. Without top-down oversight, 
these open, highly participatory organizations may form around an issue—ad hoc and autotelic—
and then disperse. Cooperatives may incorporate aspects of this radical unionism, but a focus on 
maximizing individual liberty may make cooperation difficult. IIFOR writes, “The anarchist 
ideal has 100% horizontal organization, i.e. 100% socialism and autonomy, no hierarchy, and no 
authoritarian relations between people/persons, and no authorities political/administrative and 
economically, and no disorganization, chaotical tendencies” (“Economic-Political Sociology and 
Industrial Organization Research”; Restakis, 2010).  
Figure 1: Overlap of flat arrangements 
Each of these types of networked, horizontal organizations represents one way of organizing 
21 
around work in the age of new capitalism. Worker autonomy and flexibility are fundamental 
principles in each case, a similar foundation for worker cooperatives. However, cooperatives 
take autonomy and democratic participation even further, to shared ownership of the business 
itself. 
 
Cooperative Business 
 Constructed by and for its members, a cooperative challenges basic tenets of conventional 
business like top-down exertions of power through surveillance and texts. In this section, I first 
provide an overview of a cooperative and highlight some important features: a balance of 
community needs and profit, democratic member control, and profitability. I also explore some 
of the ways a collectively run cooperative differs from the conventional business model outlined 
above.  
 When the United Nations declared 2012 the Year of the Cooperative (IYC), it cited the 
importance of the cooperative to the social and economic wellbeing of the communities they 
serve (social.un.org). Because of the potentially unique contributions of cooperatives to 
economies of communities, the United Nations has taken a keen interest in cooperative 
development. 
Cooperatives are business enterprises owned and controlled by the very members 
that they serve. Their member-driven nature is one of the most clearly 
differentiating factors of cooperative enterprises. This fact means that decisions 
made in cooperatives are balanced by the pursuit of profit, and the needs and 
interests of members and their communities. (social.un.org)  
The International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) defines a cooperative as “an autonomous 
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association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural 
needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise” 
(ica.coop). Importantly, advocates are careful to point out that it is this joint and democratic 
control and not any kind of eschewing of profit or capital that sets the cooperative model apart 
from other ways of doing business. Rather, the cooperative model seeks to balance profit with 
the needs of the communities they serve (social.un.org; Williams 2007; Zeuli and Cropp n.d.). 
 
Democratic Control 
 The cornerstone of a cooperative is democratic control. At least in theory, rather than 
ownership and control being in the hands of investors, a CEO, or the owner, the control rests 
with the multiple owners of the cooperative, operating on the “one person, one vote” principle 
(Zeuli and Cropp 45; see also Cheney 1995; Pittman n.d.; Murphy 2011; Riverwest Public House 
Cooperative Bylaws 2011). The foundational principle of democratic control is the barest 
definition of a cooperative and a trait all cooperatives share to a degree. In the preface to 
Williams’s comprehensive study of cooperatives, Cheney writes: 
If there is a family resemblance among organizations which call themselves 
cooperatives, we may say that they share these aspects: 1) some commitment to 
collective if not necessarily equal ownership by members, 2) some commitment to 
democratic decision making by members, and 3) a belief in the viability of like 
experiments outside of their own experience. (xiv)  
Cheney’s list of three defining aspects of a cooperative describes what democratic control, the 
single most distinctive feature of a cooperative, looks like in action: equality in ownership, 
democracy in decision-making, and viability of other kinds of experiments outside of their own 
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experience. These three aspects, along with other locally contingent values, help shape the 
cooperative to fit the particular needs of the community.  
 Democratic control is not mutually exclusive from profit. However, in the case of the 
cooperative, pursuit of profit is tempered by these other concerns and needs that are of equal 
importance. In other words, in order to meet these ethical and social obligations, the cooperative 
model must also be economically successful, stable, and sustainable.  
 
Profit: Interdependent and Sustainable Communities 
 Despite the possible complexities and difficulties of democratic control or the long-held 
belief in the necessity of the hierarchy in a business (Kastelle 2013; Winsor 2007), profit is not 
antithetical to cooperative principles. In fact, a cooperative can be extremely profitable. Zeuli 
and Cropp write: 
Cooperatives do not, as is sometimes assumed, contradict the goals of capitalism. 
If that were the case, cooperatives would not play such an important role in the 
American economy. (2)  
In fact, large enterprises in the United States are cooperatives, including Recreational Equipment 
Incorporated (REI), Ocean Spray, Sunkist, Land O’ Lakes, and over 10,000 credit unions 
(Williams 14-16). Internationally, the success of the Mondragon Cooperative has surpassed 
expectations, impacting the economy of the Basque region of Spain and serving as an example to 
many cooperatives and communities around the world (Billeaux et al. 2011; Cheney 1995; 
Dewan 2014; Murphy 2011; Riverwest Public House Cooperative Board Manual 2013; Williams 
2007; Zeuli and Cropp n.d.).  
 The lasting success of cooperatives is due in part to the interdependence of the 
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cooperatives and the communities they serve. Williams argues that both the early success and the 
long-term sustainability of a cooperative rely on continued community investment, which rivals 
or surpasses corporations.  
 [N]ational records show that 60 to 80 percent of corporations in the US [sic] fail 
after their first year in business, and cooperatives fail only at the rate of about 10 
percent after their first year (WOCCU 2003). The initial success of a cooperative 
most likely arises from the fact that starting a cooperative requires a great deal of 
support from the community. Many people must be involved for the successful 
cooperative to file for incorporation or limited liability, so that few are likely to 
fail within the first few years of operation. Cooperatives are also more likely to 
survive in the long term. More than 90 percent of cooperatives are still operating 
while only 3-5 percent of standard corporations remain active after five years. (9-
10) 
Current research shows this relationship between cooperative ownership and productivity is 
more complex than previously thought, and may depend on the level of participation at the 
managerial level (Logue and Yates 101-104). Nevertheless, most scholarship agrees that 
cooperatives’ commitment to community arises in that it is operated and owned by the 
community itself, for the benefit of the community. According to Williams and Murphy, if a 
community organizes and opens a cooperative, it will keep the doors open for longer periods, 
longer perhaps than corporations will. If a cooperative opens at all, it is statistically going to be 
in operation longer than non-cooperative businesses (Dewan 2014; Murphy 2011; Williams 
2007). 
 Scholars have speculated the reason for cooperative profitability and sustainability is that 
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most cooperatives are small and labor-intensive and are not reliant on “innovations in product or 
technology” (Dewan 2014; Rinehart 2006). There are notable exceptions, but most cooperatives 
cannot afford to build their business around innovative technology and instead operate in 
industries without that need, which may actually contribute to their success and long-term 
profitability (Cheney 1995; Rinehart 2006).  
 The profitability and sustainability of the cooperative model make it an attractive business 
model in the U.S. and abroad. Recent United Nations statistics show the cooperative movement 
is expanding in countries all over the world, including the United States. 
The country with the largest number of individual members indirectly represented 
by the ICA is the United States with 305.6 million members. There are nearly 
30,000 co-operatives in the U.S. ica.coop  
Cooperatives have been a force in the U.S. economy since its foundation. According to Zeuli and 
Cropp, the first cooperative was founded in 1752 and the first cooperative law was established in 
1865 (56). Seven percent of the U.S. population are members of a cooperative (12).   
 The cooperative model is a significant contributor to the U.S. economy. The University of 
Wisconsin Center for Cooperatives provides up-to-date statistics in their economic report 
“Research of the Economic Impact of Cooperatives.” According to their recent study, nearly 
30,000 U.S. cooperatives account for more than 
 $3 trillion in assets 
 $653 billion in revenue 
 Two million jobs 
 $75 billion in wages (reic.uwcc.wisc.edu/issues/)  
So then, contrary to the common belief that cooperatives and democratic control are antithetical 
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to profit, scholars have shown that the economic vitality of a cooperative firm can match or 
exceed that of conventional firms (Cheney 1995; Fakhfakh, Perotin, and Gago 2009; Dewan 
2014; Kastelle 2013). In his response to criticism of the cooperative model as unprofitable, 
Cheney counters profitability is required in order for the cooperative to exist, and cooperation 
and profit are not mutually exclusive, challenging the assumption that profitability and broader 
community goals are incompatible.   
For cooperative and alternative organizations themselves, obviously they cannot 
have a social impact without sheer economic survival. This is the type of 
“realism” typically addressed at those who start up worker and other kinds of co-
ops. The obverse of this question, though, is equally important: of what good is 
“prosperity” if it does not include a broader commitment to workers, the 
community, and the environment? (xvii) 
As Cheney points out, the primary difference between the conventional and the cooperative is 
not whether or not either can economically survive, but instead, what prosperity brings. For the 
cooperative, the answer lies in part in benefits to its members and the communities in which it 
exists, in contrast to a conventional firm that may be driven by profit for shareholders or the 
owner (Zeuli and Cropp n.d.). The widespread adoption of the Rochdale principles is an example 
of this value-driven economic commitment.  
 
Balance of Community Needs 
 The Rochdale Principles are foundational values adopted by many cooperatives. These 
seven principles are named after the successful Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers in 
England in the 18th century, a large successful cooperative that formed because of a labor dispute 
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(RWPH Board Manual 2013; Williams 2007; Zeuli and Cropp n.d.). These principles, sometimes 
known as the “Rochdale Principles of Cooperation,” have become generally accepted guidelines 
for cooperative enterprise around the world (sometimes modified for legal or other restraints), 
and form the base of cooperative economic theory.  
1. Voluntary and open membership 
2. Domestic member control 
3. Member economic participation 
4. Autonomy and independence 
5. Education, training, and information 
6. Cooperation among cooperatives 
7. Concern for community (Riverwest Public House Cooperative Board Manual 4-5; 
Williams 12; Zeuli and Cropp 9) 
These values reflect a cornerstone of cooperative identity: a tangible demonstration of 
compassionate concern and a balance between community, member involvement, and profit. In 
addition to civic concern distinguishing cooperatives from conventional ventures, cooperatives 
potentially offer a sustainable business model based on reciprocity between business and 
community (ica.coop; Murphy 2011; social.un.org; Williams 2007; Zeuli and Cropp n.d.).  
 
Cooperative Management  
 Within the bounds of democratic control, a cooperative can be managed in several ways, 
including incorporating a hierarchy that resembles a conventional business. The three most 
recognized options for management and ownership models are  
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 Employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) 
 Worker-owned cooperative 
 Worker collective (Zeuli and Cropp 37)  
As an ownership model, ESOPs may resemble traditional business in that the workers may 
institute a traditional managerial structure; ownership may be predicated on the length of service, 
hours worked, or other restraints. In contrast, the worker-owned cooperative and worker 
collective have workers at the center of management directly controlling the business.  
 
Worker-Owned Cooperative 
 In a worker-owned cooperative, the employees legally own the business, but only 
employees are allowed to be members (newerawindows.com; isthmuseng.com; cultivate.coop). 
Isthmus Engineering and Manufacturing (IEM) is one example of a widely successful worker-
owned cooperative (Billeaux et al. 2011).  
Worker cooperatives are a cooperative in which the members are the working 
staff. Management decisions are made democratically: one member-one vote. 
Each member shares in the responsibility of managing the business. 
isthmuseng.com 
A recent study concluded: 
IEM, as a worker-owned cooperative, has not only been successful in surviving in 
a high-technology industry for over three decades, but it grown [sic], recorded 
stable revenues, and has provided competitive incomes for its employees. 
(Billeaux et al. 3) 
The success of Isthmus Engineering and Manufacturing in a struggling field demonstrates how 
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democratic control is a viable structure in a highly technical, competitive business.  
 
Worker Collective 
 Another type of cooperative management is the worker collective. A collective is a group 
without a hierarchy (cultivate.coop). A worker collective, then, is a group of workers functioning 
without hierarchy. Like a worker cooperative, employees jointly make decisions about the daily 
operations of the business. Zeuli and Cropp describe worker collective management.  
The term collective in this context refers to a management style rather than an 
ownership model. Thus, a worker-owned cooperative can also be a collective. 
Collectives are managed by the entire membership instead of a select membership 
team; they have a flat management structure rather than a hierarchal one. (37) 
Collective organization is a form of management that does not necessarily rely on a general 
manager for direction, discipline, or daily operations of the business. Although the workers 
themselves may appoint a manager, this structure is not imposed, but would necessarily have to 
arise from the workers and be responsible to the workers (“Job Descriptions”). In addition, 
because the manager was elected rather than appointed from above, the manager answers to—
and may be relieved by—the other workers. Cooperators call this reciprocity: “managing the 
manager” (Patty2). This reciprocity in effect neutralizes the asymmetrical power dynamic in 
worker-manager hierarchies because the workers are able to exert some control over 
management—in theory, and in actuality (see Vignette 1; Longo 80; Winsor Writing Power 7).  
 Membership in the collective grants the worker decision-making power. Unlike 
                                                 
 
 
2 Name, gender, and other identifying characteristics have been changed.  
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conventional firms where decisions are made by a handful of qualified individuals, with or 
without feedback from the employees, in a collective, each member is expected to fully 
participate and decisions are made by the group. This act demonstrates that worker autonomy 
and valued labor are driving principles of worker collectivity (Riverwest Public House 
Cooperative Bylaws 2011). The values and operations of a worker collective are a stark contrast 
to the operations of top-down management, what Drucker calls a “command-and-control model 
that business took from the military 100 years ago” (3). Power and hierarchy in this command-
and-control model have historically been the main concern of professional and technical 
scholarship.   
 
An Evaluation of Power and Hierarchy in Conventional and Cooperative 
Firms 
Authority is whatever makes people obey. -Hannah Arendt 
 
 A Foucauldian analysis of power in an organization asks “how” rather than “who” or 
“why,” and views power as a set of relations—however unequal—existing as a web or network, 
and not as an object or force any one person can possess (Herndl and Licona 2007; Winsor 2003, 
2007). Professional communication scholarship has long deployed a Foucauldian lens when 
examining power (Henry 2010; Longo 2000; Clark 2007; Winsor 1993, 2003). Using this lens, 
Winsor writes that in hierarchical companies, power is never distributed equally. 
The uneven distribution of power is not due to individual heroic accomplishments 
that result in merited differences. Rather it is accomplished in the systematic use 
of sociotechnical means, including generic texts… that slip unnoticed beneath the 
surface of everyday life… [P]ower is constructed in the trivialities of everyday 
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life that are so taken for granted as to be transparent to us. (155) 
Power is best understood as a set of relations, and understanding power as a relation resists 
positioning it as an object that can be possessed. Instead, power rests at an intersection of several 
different practices. This change in view from power as a possession to power as a node in a 
network also shifts the way we think about agency.  
If we understand power as a set of relations… it no longer requires that we 
connect it to an autonomous individual. So, too, with agency. It does not reside in 
a set of objective rhetorical abilities of a rhetor, or even her past 
accomplishments. Rather, agency exists at the intersection of a network of 
semiotic, material, and yes, intentional elements and relational practices. (Herndl 
and Licona 137) 
Like Herndl and Licona, Winsor, and Longo, Russell dismisses the notion that power can be 
possessed or that it flows through a system. Instead, for Russell, it is mediated and localized.  
Power appears in specific, locatable occasions of mediated action and is created in 
the network of many localized instances. It is not an inchoate climate of force or 
terror, although such atmospheres are (re)created by the operationalizing of 
specific actions in mediated activity systems. (524) 
How does power operate through a collective? What does agency look like? Without a set of 
firm bureaucratic structures in place, the habitus of subordination and command, the religion and 
mythos of authority empowering a manager and ensuring obedience, how does power operate 
without clear-cut networks (Arendt 1961; Rinehart 2006; Zuboff 1988)? If power is a set of 
relations at the “intersection of a network of semiotic, material, intentional and relational 
practices,” then perhaps within a structureless organization relying on social contracts between 
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players (Freeman 1), social capital gains primacy. By means of tools like genres and other 
symbolic power, access to established authorities like founders, demonstrations of commitment, 
and even proximity, certain people establish relations that empower them more than others. In 
such an environment, the kinds of social conditions that matter might include 
 Longevity of service  
 Time on the job and the visibility and articulation of that work 
 Leisure time to devote to the business 
 Access to authorized representations 
 Access to the elected leaders or becoming an elected leader themselves  
 Access to meetings, both formal and informal  
 Visible articulations of intellect, wealth, and education 
 Gender, race, and class, according to the bias of the group 
 The ability to operationalize on the rhetoric of empowerment.  
Without the bureaucratic structure of a hierarchy, perhaps these practices create the conditions 
for power and can become embedded in the genres they produce (Arendt 1961; Freeman 1970).  
 At question is how authority works, including who has authorized textual access, within an 
organization that is supposedly flat. Mirroring traditional organizations, some mechanisms seem 
to authorize some actors over others. Arendt writes, “Authority precludes the use of external 
means of coercion where force is used, authority itself has failed. Authority, on the other hand, is 
incompatible with persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a process of 
argumentation” (2). This section compares and contrasts manifestations of power and hierarchy 
in cooperatives and conventional organizations through rhetorics of empowerment and the 
mechanisms of surveillance at work in an ostensibly democratic workplace. 
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Rhetoric of Empowerment  
 One example of how power works in collective management is through rhetorics of 
empowerment. Although it has not been studied in a cooperative, professional communication 
has long analyzed the instantiation of rhetorics of empowerment, its pervasiveness, and the 
resulting re-investment of worker capital. Clark defines empowerment as broadly including a 
“sense of the reward system afforded by the job, personal autonomy, pay, benefits, the ability to 
choose tasks and structure one’s day, and the value placed on work by colleagues” (161). 
Rinehart, Clark, and Cheney’s work support the idea that “empowerment” includes some sort of 
control over their work, including the “intensity and duration,” and the “ability to define the 
manner in which work is organized, divided and allocated…” (Rinehart 12; Cheney 5; Clark 169, 
171). Narratives of empowerment that promise autonomy, like those researched by Clark, 
contrast Cheney’s definition of workplace democracy. 
A system of governance which truly values individual goals and feelings (e.g., 
equitable remuneration, the pursuit of enriching work and the right to express 
oneself as well as typically organizational objectives (e.g., effectiveness and 
efficiency, reflectively conceived), which actively fosters the connection between 
those two sets of concerns by encouraging individual contributions to important 
organizational choices, and which allows for the ongoing modification of the 
organization's activities and policies by the group. (5)  
Empowerment and workplace democracy have two facets: the narratives and the actualization. 
Rinehart, Cheney, and Clark have critiqued narratives of empowerment as potentially 
disempowering workers. Clark’s critique asserts that the rhetoric of empowerment may be 
operationalized to actually require more work, especially managerial work, without the social, 
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economic, and other work-related rewards of managerial work.  
 In the past, rhetorics of empowerment have taken varying forms. Rinehart and Cheney 
have both critiqued worker councils in which companies organize workers on a council as a way 
of providing some input, however limited, to the owners and managers. Similarly, the “Quality 
of Work Life” movement in the 1970s emphasized individual participation and cooperation. 
Rinehart argues these management-worker innovations and “empowering” work movements 
were a way to placate employees without giving them real access to influence (Rinehart 49; see 
also Cheney 5; Zuboff 241-242). He further argues workplaces’ reformation toward participatory 
management or including workers on management councils (or even ESOPs) were a way to 
mollify workers, to “circumvent genuine unions” or other democratic mechanisms (49). Of this 
very issue, Shaila Dewan recently wrote in New York Times Magazine:   
…a workplace doesn’t have to be managed by committee in order to channel 
more of the capital share to labor. Workers can just be given stock… But even 
this can be just another management strategy to harness the increased productivity 
that, studies have shown, accompany employee-ownership and profit sharing. 
(2014) 
A rhetoric of empowerment, including ESOPs, can be a powerful tactic used by management to 
extract more from workers (Dawan 2014; Logue and Yates 2001).   
 Examining the promise of narratives of empowerment from a position of democracy and 
empowerment, Cheney provides a useful heuristic that locates democratic empowerment as 
delimited and defined by three factors. 
1. The range of issues treated in a particular program 
2. The extent of actual influence by employees 
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3. The highest levels at which influence is exercised (13)  
For example, a worker’s council may have access to a broad range of issues and some actual 
influence, but may only exercise that influence on the lowest levels of a corporate structure, or 
may provide council, but not actually influence change. This rubric will be useful later on in my 
project as I try to quantify the empowerment of workers in the Workers Collective. The 
pervasive and penetrating influence of rhetoric of empowerment in the cooperative structure 
goads the worker or volunteer under the auspices of a higher calling of “democracy” and 
“autonomy.”  
 Due in part to cooperatives operationalizing their own unique rhetoric of empowerment, 
many studies point to worker-run businesses having a higher level of productivity than a 
traditionally run business (Craig and Pencavel 1995; Doucouliagos 1995; Fakhfakh, Virginie and 
Gago 2009; Rinehart 2006). Despite the comprehensive studies of the rhetoric of empowerment 
in conventional businesses, the potential for capitalizing on the rhetoric of empowerment for 
greater expenditures of labor does not stop there. The possibility of exploitation of workers 
within a cooperative is evident in Rinehart’s description of worker cooperatives.  
Despite the failures, worker cooperatives often have excellent results in terms of 
normal criteria of business success… If sales drop, workers take pay cuts and 
collectively reduce their working hours. One economic advantage enjoyed by 
cooperatives is that workers’ commitment and diligence is high. This produces a 
second advantage: less supervision is needed than in conventional firms. (211) 
Though arguably a cynical view, there is a possibility for exploitation of such commitment, 
especially if the position is already a low paying job, as is the case with many service industry 
cooperatives like the one I studied.  
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 Because of this commitment and the desire for consent and unanimity, the rhetoric of 
empowerment is a feedback loop and a powerful management tactic weaved into the narrative of 
the cooperative, enabling and constraining workers (Foucault 1979; Longo 2000; Winsor 2003). 
While Clark, Longo, Winsor, and others have not yet covered collective management or worker 
cooperatives, Clark provides a useful heuristic for investigating power/empowerment in co-ops.  
 In Clark’s essay, the habitus-hierarchy dialectic provides the potential for empowerment. 
Habitus is “the set of durable dispositions inculcated in the subject by her past experiences, and 
these dispositions adjust the subject’s rhetorical actions to the continually changing situation.” 
(Bourdieu 53, quoted in Herndl and Licona 138). The dialectic between habitus and hierarchy 
mediated through a rhetoric of worker empowerment in the cooperative model may actually 
disempower workers. In other words, if there are no mechanisms to address dysfunction or to 
ensure accountability or transparency, or if the power to remove an ineffectual employee is 
diffused among many workers, some of whom have competing interests, the goals of worker 
empowerment may fall short (Clark 2006; Freeman n.d.). 
 Clark points to narratives of empowerment as “regulated information access, but also by 
position, education, profession, and the solidification and dissolution of organizational networks” 
(155). As Clark talks about new technologies in our culture sold using narratives of 
empowerment and democratization (157), so cooperatives have their own rhetoric of 
empowerment and democratization, operationalized to gain consent from the workers. The story 
here is changed only slightly. Just as a conventional workplace can deploy a rhetoric of 
empowerment to convince employees to take on managerial tasks (and the accompanying 
mechanisms and technologies that control that influence), cooperatives can do the same, but 
without the incentive of financial rewards (Clark 156). In a worker cooperative where 
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responsibility is diffused among a group, the few with a little more power than others (discussed 
later) can operationalize this narrative to gain consent and/or unanimity. From bylaws to worker 
protocol documents to PR and marketing materials, texts reinforce the narrative that at a 
cooperative, employees are more empowered, simultaneously selling the cooperative ideas to 
both the workers and the public, while encouraging workers to take on more to maintain/support 
that empowerment, without financial rewards, as Rinehart, Cheney, and others have pointed out.  
 The cooperative structure, often under collective management, demands and receives a 
higher member and community investment in place of traditional capital investors. As a business 
that commonly eschews traditional debt, community investment is key to the economic success 
of this business and of cooperatives in general (Williams 2007; Zeuli and Cropp n.d.). Murphy 
states this community investment is fundamental to the economic viability of the cooperative.  
…[C]o-ops with strong early-membership bases often have the support of the 
community and loyal clientele that keeps them in business for a prolonged period 
of time. Co-ops without this fundamental asset do not open for business at all. 
(19)  
Therefore, beyond a leftist curiosity, the prosperity and continued success of a worker-run 
business can add to workplace communications unique examples of collective management: the 
activity of ongoing negotiations without a centralized structure, which includes a rhetoric of 
empowerment and operationalizing consent of the Collective. A study of their communication 
practices—the successes and the disruptions—could add to and possibly reconfigure what we 
think about typified group communication and recurrent empowerment narratives, how workers 
communicate with each other to monitor and maintain power and to ensure productivity.  
 An investigation into the productivity and economic success of a deliberately democratic 
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organization could be beneficial for business research in gaining an understanding of the 
relationship between hierarchy, capital, and worker productivity. How the cooperative model is 
gaining ground in a tough economy when it demands more capital from its members and the 
surrounding communities while demanding more of its workers for lower wages could inform—
and possibly reform—professional communication to consider models that are more deliberately 
democratic (Murphy 2011; Williams 2007; ica.coop).  
 
Democracy under Surveillance: Cooperative Management and Mutual Monitoring 
 The seventh Rochdale Principle prioritizes a concern for the community (Williams 2007; 
Zeuli and Cropp n.d.). However, despite good intentions, cooperative management may fall into 
some of the old Taylorist narratives and management strategies. Rinehart suggests that due to 
market forces, a cooperative can come to resemble a conventional business, propelled solely by 
profitability despite its democratic nature.  
Profitability has to be an essential criterion of operating the business, and this 
exerts a powerful influence on the policies and operations of worker-owned firms. 
Consequently, the technology, division of labor, and work procedures of worker-
owned enterprises come to resemble the structures that prevail in capitalist firms. 
As Marx recognized, “The co-operative factors of labourers themselves represent 
with the old form the first sprouts of the new, although they naturally reproduce, 
and must reproduce everywhere in their actual organization all the shortcomings 
of the prevailing system.” (Marx 440, qt. Rinehart 212)  
After all, cooperatives—like all movements and institutions—are built from the available models 
and tools (Polletta 221). In the case of an alternative business model, there is a limited repertoire 
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of management strategies from which to choose.  
 Cooperatives often have explicit hierarchies. Each cooperative has a Board of Directors, 
employees (or volunteers), and owners. In the case of a worker cooperative, the employees are 
the owners and may sit on the Board of Directors. Wisconsin law dictates that each cooperative 
must have a Board of Directors in correlation to its member base (Zeuli and Cropp n.d.). A 
cooperative can resemble a conventional business with its goals balanced with a clear dedication 
to democratic control by its members.  
 A similar system of surveillance and control that underpins conventional firms is intact and 
operational in many collectives and worker cooperatives alike. Collectives utilize shared 
supervising, relying on group norms, internalization of rules, and vigilance for deviation of 
norms and etiquette set by the group (Polletta 16). In a worker collective, the mechanism of 
observation and mutual reporting often remains intact, but with a plan for substitution in case the 
management system breaks down. This substitution could be a human resources committee, a 
trusted member of the cooperative or community, or a Board of Directors. Cheney and Billeaux 
et al.’s research on democratic management shows how collective management adopted similar 
systems of surveillance and, removing the management gaze, dispersed it into a crowd of 
observers.  
 Among cooperatives, this dispersal is sometimes called mutual monitoring (Billeaux et al.  
2011; Cheney 1995). Cheney describes mutual monitoring as “looking over each other’s 
shoulders, group observations,” or in a leaderless group or group without an outside supervisor, 
“group members can develop an internal system of discipline that involves a great deal of 
monitoring of one another and a corresponding loss of individual autonomy” (9). The efficacy of 
mutual monitoring is evident when comparing a conventionally structured business’s operation 
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of panoptic observation to IEM. From Billeaux et al.’s case study on IEM:  
It cannot be overstated that the cooperative structure of the firm has a major 
impact on how employees experience their work. They consistently pointed out 
absence of hierarchy. There is no particular person within the firm to whom they 
must answer, who is continually compelling them to work, and who has the last 
word on project designs. Instead, they pointed to self-motivation and mutual 
monitoring as the most important incentives to work, as opposed to being “under 
the thumb” of management. (10) 
Under a cooperative structure like IEM, worker productivity, discipline, and timely action are 
supervised through mutual monitoring, rather than by an overseer or the internalization of rules.  
 A collective by definition is antithetical to a formalized hierarchy. However, a collective 
also has the potential to be appropriated for undemocratic purposes. For example, an informal 
hierarchy may take shape. In fact, Freeman writes the lack of clear structure opens a vacuum for 
elites, “stars,” and friend groups to take power over the rest of the group. Freeman seems to 
agree with Fagle’s above definition of hierarchical advancement as a fundamental human 
motive, inescapable even in the most “structureless” organization (1) and Kastelle says operating 
without hierarchy can be difficult and seemingly impossible. In “Tyranny of Structurelessness,” 
Freeman criticizes the structurelessness and seemingly flat structure of the second-wave feminist 
movement (1970). Freeman argues that the structurelessness of many in second-wave 
consciousness-raising and action groups actually created a vacuum that allowed a small 
privileged group to gain power without the checks and balances of a formalized structure.  
A “laissez-faire” group is about as realistic as a “laissez-faire” society; the idea 
becomes a smokescreen for the strong or the lucky to establish unquestioned 
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hegemony over others. (1)  
This habitus-hierarchy dialectic could result in an imbalance of power, settling social capital in 
the hands of a few “stars” or “friend groups” (Freeman 2) to do what could be called the “heavy 
lifting” of the group, but without the mechanism of oversight.  
 Decisions can be made outside of meetings in a social setting, seemingly as harmless as 
sitting around having beers and hashing out the topics or issues that the business has been facing. 
These discussions may happen informally as business comes up in discussion among friends. 
Solutions can be thought up together, but only with the input of this particular friend group. 
People who are not a part of this friend group can be felt “swept up” by the majority or friend 
group bloc. In this way, consent of the whole collective and, in a sense, the democratic goal of 
the group is side-stepped (Freeman 3; Polletta 140, 166-167).  
 This affinity dynamic is actually complex—and Freeman acknowledges this complexity—
because the affinity group can act with expediency and swiftness with productive problem-
solving discussion (albeit, with fewer members). Relying on larger group discussion to solve 
problems can be a difficult, tedious, and unreliable process especially with people who are new 
or unknowledgeable about business, people with their own agendas or grudges, etc. (Freeman 
1971; Polletta 2002). This friend-group problem solving is streamlined and efficient, able to keep 
up with the speed of business and the daily, real demands of management. It might be discovered 
that friend groups are necessary in order to run a business efficiently. As we will see later, an 
unchecked collective of people can form cliques or hierarchies within an ostensibly democratic 
workplace and this affinity dynamic can become written into the very governmental texts they 
produce. The tension at the heart of this structure is part of a larger discussion between 
participatory democracy commitments and the need for practical strategy (Polletta 2002).  
42 
 Collective management is unique because democratic control necessitates negotiation and 
deliberation, in contrast to businesses built around maximum efficiency and profit, where 
democratic control could slow down the process.  
 
Overview of the Project 
Research Questions 
The main purpose of my project is to find out more about the kind of genres cooperatives 
employ and how these genres mediate change in the cooperatives. I argue the Public House is 
rhetorically constructed and reconstructed by ongoing negotiations among stakeholders, and 
strengthened by narratives of democracy and empowerment. These negotiations are mediated 
through tools including email and SMS, incorporating and supporting an atmosphere of 
democracy and consent—a key value of the cooperative—while ensuring work is done on time 
and within budget. This ongoing mediation is key to the enrollment of actors as well as gaining 
and retaining consent and unanimity of the Collective.  
 My study was guided by the following questions on what collective management can offer 
professional communication scholarship.  
1. How does a cooperative employ genres differently?  
2. What do these texts tell us about how power is distributed in a cooperative?  
3. How do the genres it employs affect organizational change?  
Focusing on these questions will help me understand the configurations of power at this site.  
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Dissertation Chapters   
2: Research Design and Methodology 
 I explain why conducting a qualitative case study is the best way to investigate collective 
management and communication practices, and to address my research questions. I provide my 
rationale for the study design and methodology, and describe my role as the participant/observer 
and someone who plays multiple roles in this research site.  
 
3: Rhetorical Construction of the Public House 
I begin to answer my research questions as I examine how the Public House is 
constructed rhetorically through tight networks of people and the genres they created and 
employed. I argue for a profound contradiction between values and practice.  
 
4: Dream and Death of a Dream: Rearrangement of an Organization through Rhetorical Strategy  
 I examine the transient nature of the Public House. Looking at unifying documents created 
at different points in time, I trace organizational changes and the narratives that facilitated those 
changes. Because people involved had direct access to governance, they could pivot in a very 
short time. This unfettered access resulted in a nimble, responsive organization.  
 
5: Conclusion: Implications for the Field 
 I conclude this project by considering the implications this project could have on the fields 
of professional communication and cooperative development. I also suggest implications for 
actor-network theory and genre theory. I conclude with a look toward future research projects. 
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology and Methods 
In the last chapter, I provided an overview of cooperative and traditional businesses, 
explored some areas of contrast or similarities between them, and established the problems of 
assumptions in professional communication research. Emerging theories point to the need for a 
new model for understanding communication in horizontal organizations. In this chapter, I will 
explain why the best way to study collective management and communication practices—and to 
address my research questions—is to conduct a qualitative case study. First, I offer an overview 
of my research site and my research questions, hypothesis, and rationale for the study design and 
methodology. Second, I clarify how I addressed the criteria for judging the quality of research 
design―construct validity, internal/external validity, reliability. Finally, I address my role as the 
participant/observer, and as someone who plays multiple roles in this research site.  
The aim of this project was to identify the complexities of collective management at the 
Public House, how negotiations of power occur, their effects on productivity, and how and in 
what ways communication tools are appropriated in the negotiation process. To conduct 
systematic research, data collection, and analysis, I employed actor-network theory and genre 
theory to analyze organizational communication and productivity within the Collective and the 
Board against the backdrop of day-to-day operations.  
 
Research Setting 
An analysis of the strengths and limitations of collective management within a successful 
cooperative would benefit professional communication scholarship by adding an understanding 
of the practices of a model with limited investigation to date. The prime setting for my research 
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was Public House, a collectively run, cooperatively owned bar in the working-class 
neighborhood of Riverwest in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  
Wisconsin has the legal and political infrastructure, the financial climate (Williams 2007; 
Rinehart 2006; Lawless and Reynolds 2004), and deeply rooted cultural leanings to support 
cooperatives. Wisconsin has been an epicenter of the labor movement and the cooperative 
economy, in the form of agricultural, health, and consumer cooperatives, for decades. Wisconsin 
passed its first cooperative law in 1887, but in 1911, it passed a comprehensive bill that has since 
been copied by many other states (Zeuli and Cropp 25). This statute, Chapter 185, outlines the 
legal and financial obligations for cooperative operation including responsibilities to members, 
and gives affordances to cooperatives as a legal business under governmental purview. Because 
of this infrastructure, Wisconsin is home to many cooperatives including agricultural, health 
care, food, service industry, distribution, and housing cooperatives.  
 With a population of 13,065 (“Riverwest neighborhood in Milwaukee, Wisconsin”), 
Riverwest is a small, diverse neighborhood situated between Capitol Drive on the north, North 
Avenue on the south, Holton Street on the west, and the Milwaukee River on the east. Riverwest 
is home to many grassroots neighborhood events like large street and music festivals, a 24-hour 
DIY bike race, public theater performances, a free night school, a community nurse, a non-profit 
community newspaper, after school programs, victory gardens, a large solar funding project, a 
community-run radio station with all original content, and a community free space. Due to 
cooperative support on the state level, a higher than average education (“Riverwest 
neighborhood in Milwaukee, Wisconsin”), and the existing energy of community spirit, 
grassroots activism, and a DIY habitus that could be described as “progressive” or “radical,” 
Riverwest is uniquely home to more cooperatives than an average neighborhood, including  
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 Riverwest Co-op and Café 
 Riverwest Bakery Co-op 
 Eight Limbs Housing Cooperative 
 People’s Books Cooperative 
 Riverwest Investment Cooperative 
 Riverwest Yogashala 
 Riverwest Public House Cooperative 
 Outpost Natural Foods 
 Milwaukee River Advocates 
The Riverwest Cooperative Alliance (RCA) is a new cooperative that views itself as an umbrella 
organization that supports and starts more cooperatives. A self-described “co-op of co-ops,” 
RCA capitalized on the ruling of Citizens United, which affirmed the legal personhood of a 
business. In this case, the businesses themselves become members of a larger cooperative. The 
website describes the group as  a “cooperative alliance of organizations dedicated to fostering an 
equitable and democratic economy in the Riverwest Neighborhood of Milwaukee, Wisconsin” 
(“Riverwest Cooperative Alliance”).  
In a community with dozens of cooperatives, Public House is a prime location because it 
is relatively new (less than three years old at the time of writing) and because it operates as one 
of three cooperatively owned bars in the country (at the time of writing). That this type of 
cooperative is less common but growing means that there are few extant structures from which to 
draw up the business. Most of the Public House practices, like many cooperatives, are emergent 
and contingent, heavily reliant on experts and seasoned “cooperators” in the group. These 
features are key to serving communities and to the cooperative’s survival.  
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The Public House has a two-tiered pyramid structure. The top tier consists of member-
owners, individuals who have bought into the cooperative by paying a fee of either $40 annually 
or $200 for a lifetime membership (or five years of consecutive membership) (“Membership”). 
Membership benefits—some of which are dictated by state law—include participating in 
member-only events and voting in elections (“Membership”; Zeuli and Cropp n.d.). The second 
tier consists of the Workers Collective and the Board of Directors.  
The Workers Collective, a collective of employees and contractors including bouncers, 
bartenders, an inventory coordinator, an events coordinator, and a finance team, manages the 
Public House. The Workers Collective is responsible for the daily operations of the bar including 
hiring and training, inventory, and event planning. In addition to working closely with member-
owners and the community, the Collective reports directly to the Board of Directors. The 
Workers Collective may elect team leaders.  
The Board of Directors is a group of nine members democratically elected by co-op 
members in a ballot vote. Wisconsin law dictates its existence and responsibilities, as the Board 
is legally responsible “for the co-op’s continued viability” and is accountable to the member-
owners (Zeuli and Cropp 50). In addition be being formally accountable for the actions of the 
cooperative, the Board oversees the Workers Collective (Riverwest Public House Cooperative 
Bylaws 2011).  
Though the Board of Directors shoulders the burden of legal responsibility, the bar 
operates exclusively by collective management. That this style is effective is especially curious 
given the scale of the operations and events workers accomplish via negotiation, from at-capacity 
member-only events to hosting important speakers, politicians, and music groups. Last year, the 
bar was named the second best music venue in Milwaukee, over-taking single-owned 
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establishments that have been operating for much longer. Additionally, the bar supports a full 
bartending, cleaning, auxiliary, and door-tending staff and continues to be economically self-
sufficient, avoiding traditional debt.  
 
Design of the Project: Methodologies 
Given the unique distribution of power at the Public House, I need to use nimble and 
open methodologies and methods. They also must allow for fluctuation, system analysis, and 
textual analysis. Both actor-network theory and a social theory of genre meet these conditions.  
 
Actor-network Theory 
Because the Public House deliberately functions as a horizontal network with a range of 
actors including people, texts, a physical location, disease, organization charts, etc., actor-
network theory is well suited for this project. Actor-network theory is popular in the humanities 
and social sciences as a way to account for durability and stability in assemblages (Latour 1991). 
In actor-network theory, these assemblages are made of humans and nonhumans, who play a part 
through acts of delegation and enrollment (Latour “Where” 177). Latour argues that one way 
nonhuman actants participate in our lives is by disciplining us to act or refrain from acting in a 
certain way. Through an act of substitution, “a delegated nonhuman character” would ensure a 
certain task is completed (“Where” 157). For example, a pneumatic door-closer shuts the door 
behind us to ensure a door is closed (but not slammed). Actor-network theory is one way to 
explain “how stability and domination may be accounted for once non-humans are woven into 
the social fabric,” (Latour “Technology" 103). The inclusion of nonhumans in its analysis is a 
hallmark feature of actor-network theory, a way to “challenge assumptions about social context 
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of machines,” these actants who are a part of our daily experience, who co-constitute our lives 
and our work (“Missing” 153). For Latour, discipline occurs through these acts of substitution: 
“…every time you want to know what a nonhuman does, simply imagine what other humans or 
other nonhumans would have to do were this character not present” (“Where” 155).  
Actor-network theory has been used appropriately to analyze communication systems. 
For example, in “Who Killed Rex?” Spinuzzi hybridized actor-network theory and rhetorical 
analysis to analyze telecommunication systems, using an approach that is both “political and 
rhetorical” and includes looking at the “political/rhetorical movements of complex 
heterogeneous networks” (“Who” 50-51).  Like Spinuzzi, I splice actor-network theory with 
rhetorical analysis: careful consideration of the content of the enrolled texts and the connections 
between the texts and participants, for an analysis that is flat, inclusive of nonhuman agency, and 
political/rhetorical. As actor-network theory is intentionally apolitical, this hybridization creates 
a productive tension between the two approaches. I believe using a modified actor-network 
methodology that allows for rhetorical analysis will enable me to understand not only processes 
of delegation, enrollment and translation at work in Public House networks, but also the political 
and rhetorical nature of the texts themselves.  
Actor-network theory is radically symmetrical. Rather than human-centered theory, 
which places a premium on human agency and activity, actor-network theory supports a broader 
examination of actors—both big and small—and is useful for analyzing and understanding the 
networks that support an organization, itself a network and an actant (Latour 1992, 1999; Mara 
and Hawk 2010; Spinuzzi 2007). This symmetrical, non-Cartesian approach is sometimes 
troubling for humanists as it politicizes material artifacts, even seemingly mundane texts like 
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intra-business communication. This inclusion of mundane texts makes actor-network theory well 
suited for a network like the Public House that relies on unifying documents.  
Transcription and enrollment are central to many actor-network approaches. Latour, Star, 
and Myers are interested in “what it means to be enrolled in a network,” how these “little actors 
become big actors” by “translating the interests of other actors and enrolling them,” often 
through exchanges of power, money, commodities, obedience, etc. (Myers 12). In the case of the 
Public House, that translation of interests can occur at the site of the writer and readers. An 
actor-network approach to professional communication that tends to a broader range of actors 
accounts for the social, political, material, and economic implications of the network.  
For Myers and Latour, discourse is not as a neutral tool, but is a way of understanding and 
capturing a moment of reality. Texts are integral to enrolling objects in a network.  
Two examples of an actor-network approach to enrollment, on very different scales, are 
Latour’s door-closer and the Heysham power station. Myers first uses Latour’s example to show 
that both small and large systems operate through the same complex of enrollment and 
substitution. Myers sums up Latour’s famous door-closer example:  
First, people build walls. But they need doors to get through them. But doors need 
closing. They could hire a person, a groom, to do this job. But they delegate this 
job to a machine. Now that the machine is broken, a text must be substituted to 
enroll the passing door user in closing the door. (13) 
On a much larger scale, Myers then demonstrates that the Heysham nuclear power station, 
though vastly larger and more complex, relies on the same processes of enrollment and 
substitution as the unassuming door-closer. 
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The same processes of delegation are going on in the safety system of the 
Heysham nuclear power plant. Machines are substituted for humans watching, 
texts substituted for humans directing, organizations speak for individuals; the 
whole system can be seen as a complex of the human and nonhuman. (14) 
Myers states that the plant is not a thing to be represented and separated out from its network, 
rather “it is an ongoing process of enrollment and disenrollment” (14). Myers’s description of the 
Heysham station accounts for its materiality, its “thingness” that is often lost in social and 
cultural studies around the object, as well as for the range of humans and nonhumans. Myers’s 
and Latour’s work are examples of enrollment and transcription. Actor-network theory could 
help reflect on human-nonhuman interactions at my research site by accounting for the totality of 
the material world, rather than focusing solely on the human agent acting in the world.  
The fundamental symmetry of actor-network approaches makes it fit well in an analysis 
of systems like the Public House, involving humans and nonhumans, including texts. However, 
because of its emphasis on materiality and focus on “political/rhetorical movements of complex 
heterogeneous networks” (Spinuzzi “Rex” 51), actor-network theory cannot be the only 
methodology for my site. In fact, its flatness and wide scope exclude human blame, cognition, or 
failure in favor of an ecological view. For an analysis that re-inserts human agency in the story, I 
turn to a social theory of genre.  
 
Genres: Stabilizing and Generic 
In the case of the Public House, an examination of genres in an actor-network could yield 
productive insights into group activities where recurring actions of cooperative management take 
place. Winsor invites us to consider “how a heterogeneous assembly of people can agree upon a 
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common object and act in concert over time” ("Using” 4). Spinuzzi, Russell, Miller, and Zachry 
have examined genre, intertextuality, power, and agency in a variety of sites, but the field has not 
seen a genre study in a cooperative, a site of potentially enormous social capital, where genre as 
a social action is most poignantly evident, and where one particular text can be imbued with 
great stabilizing and norming power.   
Group behavior is regulated, at least temporarily, through genres, understood as typified 
social responses to typified social situations (Miller 1984; Winsor 2003, 2007). As such, genres 
are a stabilizing force or as Catherine Schryer says, “stabilized-for-now” (1994; Winsor “Using” 
3). Understanding the social situations genres respond to—and stabilize—is key to investigating 
networks of power in an organization, even (especially) one that is horizontal like a worker 
cooperative (Spinuzzi 2007; Winsor 2003).  
Genres can be an integral part of an actor-network analysis. Spinuzzi weaves together actor-
network theory with activity theory for his analysis in “Who Killed Rex?” Winsor, too, sees the 
importance of an analysis of genres in examining systems. She writes, “Because they produce 
stable representations of shifting reality, texts are among the tools used both to create common 
objects and to coordinate activity over time” (2007, 4). Genres that coordinate the activity of 
running the Public House include 
 Maintaining and controlling inventory, payroll, and finances  
 Documenting and maintaining security 
 Controlling and maintaining permits and licensing with the city and state 
 Contacting members and community partnerships  
In addition to enabling an actor-network analysis, a social theory of genre will enable an analysis 
of the role of power in collective management. This is important because this project will 
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examine the appropriation of generic workplace genres onto a collective management structure, a 
structure necessarily relational and social. Collective management might complicate what we 
have assumed about how genres shape roles and maintain subordinate/superior positions (Winsor 
2003). Thus, the adaptation of traditional business genres in a non-hierarchical, decentralized 
structure might redefine what we think about how business genres order an organization.  
One deployment of genre theory is the lens of distributed cognition, knowledge dispersed 
among people who enable each other’s work, who “supplement and support” it (Winsor 
“Learning” 15). Distributed cognition considers thinking as an act that takes place not 
completely inside an individual’s head, but “that is distributed among the individual, other 
people, the physical environment, and the tools the person uses, including language and such 
language structures as genres” (6). Stabilized-for-now genres are fundamental in systems of 
distributed cognition, which Winsor advocates is the rule in workplaces, rather than the 
exception (5). In the case of the Public House, examples of distributed cognition include 
 Measuring how, when, and by whom tasks are completed 
 Measuring and recording behavior, especially in the case of a violation 
 Tracking decisions made either by the Workers Collective or Board of Directors 
 Tracking attendance in meetings 
 Referring back to bylaws and handbooks 
In short, in Bitzer’s terms, texts respond to a rhetorical situation and because these situations are 
repeated, a rhetorical response draws on the previous text, and a generic text is developed: “Each 
text draws on previous texts written in response to similar situations. Through such interaction of 
texts, genres evolve as recurring” (Devitt 338; Miller 1984). A text is understood as generic 
when it can be applied to multiple situations, when “[i]t does not seek detailed recreation of the 
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original encounter between author and audience; rather it seeks to recreate the symbolic context 
in which the act emerged… (27). These generic texts (genres) stabilize relationships and regulate 
actions of heterogeneous work groups so they can work together “because texts produce a stable 
representation of shifting reality” (Winsor “Using” 3). This is why it matters to study genres: 
they are stable representations that people use to regulate each other and nowhere is this feature 
more important than in the case of the mutual monitoring that occurs at worker 
cooperative/collective sites. 
Together, texts interact to create a community. Texts that interact with each other might 
be referential, functional, or generic; the subject may not be another written text, but an oral text. 
When debating an action, the text, created in collaboration and/or generalized, has authority; 
“acknowledging the authority of these texts is a prerequisite for membership in the… 
community.” (Devitt 338, 342, 345, 351, 354). Devitt’s research of intertextuality in a tax 
accountant firm shows the connected nature of genres in a community. 
They form a complex network of interaction, a structured set of relationships 
among texts, so that any text is best understood within the context of other texts. 
No text is single, as texts refer to one another, draw from one another, create the 
purpose for one another. (336) 
What Devitt is referring to is “intertextuality,” the interaction of texts “within a single discourse 
community, a single field of knowledge, and to enable the study of all types of relationships 
among texts, whether referential, generic, functional, or any other kind” (337).  
In a cooperative, negotiations of power happen without a centralized authority while 
doing business, with a concern for economic viability necessary to survive as a business and to 
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fulfill a responsibility to membership. Understanding how genres support this activity will help 
understand the dynamic forces of power and change at the Public House.  
 
Participant-Observer 
In addition to the theoretical frameworks listed above, my study also draws from an 
ethnographic perspective, acknowledging researchers also “participate in the activities they 
articulate and in the articulation of those activities” (Clark 164). In my case, my participation is 
complicated because I was hired by the Public House and joined the Workers Collective several 
years ago. In May of 2013, I was elected by members to serve on the Board of Directors. I am 
not now nor have I ever been in any supervisory relationship with any Board or Workers 
Collective members because the supervisory relationship is diffused across several people, as is 
the practice of mutual monitoring. No one person has real supervisory power over another 
(except for an elected bar supervisor, which is in turn regulated by the consent of the Workers 
Collective). However, my position in both the Collective and the Board problematized my 
relationship with my coworkers and co-directors in two ways. First, they trusted me and my 
excitement for the project in its early stages may have encouraged them to share information 
with me they may not have otherwise shared. Second, because of my relationship with 
coworkers, the fragility of the new cooperative, and the cooperative’s tenuous position as an 
alternative economic model, negative critique was difficult at times.  
The Public House also benefits from my work on this project by receiving a presentation 
and proposal for recommendations on improving workplace communication and other relevant 
findings.   
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Social Bonds of Participation  
To understand how participants related to each other and to the neighborhood, I looked to 
Francesca Polletta’s exhaustive study on participation in social movements guided by principles 
of participatory democracy, Freedom is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social 
Movements. Polletta analyzed the way people worked together to get important tasks done and 
make decisions, focusing in part on their relationships with each other in the efficacy of 
organizing for change. Her work is useful because personal dynamics are very important in a 
worker cooperative. The greatest problem with worker cooperatives and collectives—and the 
greatest strength—are the power of personal relationships in the context of a business. 
Relationships are the bond in this business, so when a relationship is strained, it can affect the 
business.  
In a collective with less formal structures, personal relationships play a much larger role 
than in a conventional business. Polletta describes these as “relational underpinnings” (18). 
Personal dynamics plays a role in any organization, but a bureaucracy may more clearly define 
the roles and boundaries of positions. Within a business built on a different kind of social 
relationship, eschewing bureaucratic means of authority and leadership, personal relationships 
have a greater influence on power.  
Polletta writes there are three primary social relations of participatory groups: religious 
fellowships such as the Quakers, tutelage as found in SNCC and early civil rights movements, 
and friendship as found in SDS and early women’s liberation collectives (2002). 
 
57 
Table 1: From Freedom is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements. F. Polletta (2002), p. 18 
 
 
 
On the friendship model in social movements, Polletta writes: 
The striking thing about these democracies was the informal quality of decision 
making and its intimacy. Discussions were long and spilled out of formal 
deliberative settings. Decisions were made by informal consensus and tasks were 
allocated or volunteered for on the basis of a combination of participants’ 
preferences and skills. Often, there was no clear line between allocating and 
volunteering for tasks. “You do this, I’ll do that”—was the standard approach. 
(19) 
Because of the horizontal structure of the Public House, understanding the relational 
underpinning of the group becomes very important. In Chapter 3, I argue that the relationships of 
the people involved in organizing the Public House match Polletta’s description of a friendship 
 
Features 
Of 
Decision 
Making 
How Groups 
Mitigate 
Ineffectiveness 
How Groups 
Mitigate 
Inequality 
Examples Of 
Movement 
Groups 
Potential 
Sources Of 
Conflict 
When Conflict 
Is Likely To 
Emerge 
Religious 
Fellowship 
Deferential 
Acceptance of 
authority within 
the group 
Participants are 
equal before God 
Pre- and post-
World War II 
pacifist 
organization 
Resistance to 
forging new 
bases of 
authority 
When dissenters 
invoke the 
dictates of 
conscience 
Tutelage Guided 
Trust in 
organizer/tutor 
Inequality is 
sphere specific 
and diminishing 
SNCC, SDS’s 
ERAP, faith-
based 
organizing 
Resistance to 
specifying the 
ends of action 
When 
movement goals 
are unclear 
Friendship 
Informal 
and 
intimate 
Mutual 
knowledge and 
trust 
Inequality is 
counterbalanced 
by participants’ 
potential, as well 
as real, skills in 
other spheres 
SDS, SNCC, 
women’s 
liberation 
collectives 
Exclusiveness 
and resistance to 
formalization 
When new 
members join or 
friendships are 
otherwise 
threatened. 
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model. Her research on the strengths and weaknesses of this model will become important as we 
untangle the networks that make up the Public House.  
 
Design of the Project: Methods 
Because of the unique setting of the Public House and the theories best suited for this 
kind of study, the methods below proved most useful. I observed staff at work with an opening 
and closing interview. I studied decision making, accountability, and transparency statements or 
questions, as well as information transactions via communications technologies. Data collection 
continued for approximately six months and involved these methods for exploring Workers’ 
Collective communication, training, and practices.  
 
Artifact Collection 
In order to understand the kinds of genres the Public House produced and employed, I 
collected artifacts from the participants that are related to workplace communication and project 
management, collaboration, information sharing, and training. Artifacts included copies of 
project to-do lists, anonymized emails, SMS, training documentation, bylaws, handbooks, 
inventory lists, event notes, and screenshots. To ensure the privacy of others, participants 
redacted artifacts before turning them over to me.  
I analyzed the observation, interview, and artifact data using ethnographic methods.  
 Memoing: Starts with, but is not limited to the extant categories of communication, time 
and project management, understanding, relationships, strategy, and training.  
 Visual representations: Activity networks, resource maps, handoff chains, triangulation 
tables, and topsight tables (Spinuzzi 2013). 
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 Member checks: I circulated drafts to participants for comments.  
 
Textual Analysis 
Using professional communication’s appropriation of actor-network theory, I analyzed a 
variety of collected texts generated by participants. Though a traditional analysis would include a 
variety of nonhumans, for this project I examined the relationships of textual artifacts and 
humans, including documents, organizational charts, and images.  
 
Site Interviews 
In order to gain insight into people’s motives, histories, and activities at the Public House, I 
conducted five-hour long, in-person, open-ended interviews with past and present staff and 
members of the Board of Directors. Interviews were audio recorded and analyzed alongside 
provided documentation.  
Interview participants were chosen if they met at least one of the following criteria. 
 Employed by Public House for longer than one year.  
 Involved in some facet of management.  
 Involved in the early developmental stages of the bar.  
 
Study Timeline 
I. Preliminary Research. I began preliminary research with background reading on U.S. 
cooperative theory and history. I focused mostly on U.S. cooperatives because of 
similarities in cooperative law and culture (i.e., what is true for a cooperative in Italy's 
famed Emilia Romagna cooperatives may not be true for a cooperative in Milwaukee). 
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Using internet searches, I collected and reviewed documentation from U.S. cooperative 
websites. This stage began prior to data collection and continued throughout my study.  
 
II. Collection. Stage two included artifact collection, meeting observation, and interviews. 
This stage also included deciding criteria for interviews and documentation. This stage 
lasted approximately six months.  
 
III. Analysis. I analyzed collected data using ethnographic methods, visualizations, and 
theoretical frameworks: actor-network theory and genre theory, as well as Polletta’s 
models of participation. This stage continued for approximately one year.  
 
IV. Findings. The final stage of this study was writing, revising, circulating, and finally 
publishing my findings.  
 
Participants 
I divided study participants into three groups according to when they became involved in 
the Public House. My project suggests that when a participant became involved is a key 
determinant of their experience at the cooperative.  
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Table 2: Participant groups 
 
 
Group A: 
Founding 
Group B: 
Early Operations 
Group C: 
Middle/Later Operations 
 
Primary 
Involvement 
Involved in formulating 
original plan and 
brainstorming structure. 
Involved in the initial 
recruitment and/or during 
the legitimation with the 
city of Milwaukee, and 
through opening 
Involved after legitimation 
with the city 
 
Participant 
 Lucas3 
 Sean 
 Sophia 
 Will 
 Levi 
 Lucy 
 Patty 
 Robert 
 Shawna 
 Xavier 
 Emily 
 Carol 
 Kyle 
 Marco 
 Nadia 
 Sarah 
 Dana 
 
 
Shown in Table 2, participants were grouped according to when they began to be regularly 
involved in building the business: attending most of the meetings in a given period, sitting as a 
director on the Board or the “proto-board,” or working a weekly shift. Workers Collective rules 
state that an employee must be a participating member of the Workers Collective in order to 
work more than 12 hours a week. Others may opt-in to the Workers Collective by attending a set 
number of meetings on a regular basis (“Introduction to New Hires Presentation” 2012.) Group 
A represents those who were among the earliest participants, where the idea for a cooperative bar 
                                                 
 
 
3 Name, gender, and other identifying characteristics have been changed. 
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originated. Group B became involved after the idea for a cooperative bar had gained steam and 
the earliest organizing efforts were underway, including recruitment and advertising.  
Importantly, at the earliest stage, the idea of the “Public House” was still very malleable, 
even more so than after it became established in the City of Milwaukee’s legal and financial 
framework. Establishing and organizing the cooperative were still underway, including licensing, 
fundraising, procuring a building, and other activities that must occur prior to opening the 
business. Many members of this group participated in transcribing the business through strategic 
documents, meeting notes, and, with the City of Milwaukee, licenses and bylaws.  
Group C represents the last group that came on board after the building was procured and 
the entity “Pubic House” had begun to be established in the Riverwest neighborhood and with 
the City of Milwaukee. For them, there was a ready-made structure to inhabit. At the point of 
Group C, idiosyncrasies were concretized into practice and had been transcribed. However, 
because of document ambiguity and with certain members having almost unfettered access to the 
governance structure of the business, we will see that Group C was also able to enact substantial 
change at the structural level.  
 
 
Chapter 3: Rhetorical Construction of the Public House: Access, 
Participation, and Contradictions 
The Public House was a tight assemblage of texts and human actors; the Public House 
formed—and was formed by—networks. That is, rather than an immutable object, the Public 
House was in constant flux, recurrently stabilized through temporary links of actors and the 
genres they employed. The key to understanding the rhetorical processes and the resultant unique 
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configurations of power at this location is to look at the founding network through an 
intersection of actor-network theory and genre theory. Actor-network theory is applicable to the 
study of communication and governance in a cooperative due to its emphasis and considerations 
of acts of enrollment—the ways humans and nonhumans work together to accomplish tasks and, 
importantly, build or break linkages. As actor-network theory enables an ecological approach to 
communication and political disruption at the Public House and incorporates both human and 
nonhuman agency, genre theory allows us to follow the texts to better understand not only the 
“what” of transcription and enrollment, but the “how” (Latour 1992, 1999; Mara and Hawk 
2010; Myers 1996; Potts 2010; Spinuzzi 2007). In this section, I argue that the network was 
initially stabilized through genre activity; I show how evolution/dissolution of networks and 
genres played a role in creating the tensions between democratic participation and exclusivity 
that come to play in Chapter 4.  
 
Founding Network: Stabilized through Texts 
In a cooperatively owned business in which group agreements are fundamental to its 
viability, genres played a central role in creating and stabilizing the business. Like all 
organizations, cooperatives are by nature social structures, built and sustained by human linkages 
enrolled together, where stability in the form of either hierarchy or genres are necessary. Despite 
the service industry’s high turnover rates and a Board of Directors elected to staggered terms 
each year, workplace texts and a constituency of long-term participants stabilized and cohered 
the group, establishing genres that outlined group behavior with goals, rules, and roles.  
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The Shape of Genres 
The initial organizers used many texts to enroll actors into the Public House network in 
order to complete tasks, hold the group together, and accomplish their common goal; access to 
these texts was key to employing the governing structures touted by the Public House. For 
example, one distinct genre organizers have since recognized as essential to the early efforts is a 
mind-map of sticky notes. People wrote their ideas for how to structure the business on sticky 
notes. Participants grouped similar ideas together. In this way, the group collaboratively 
organized the structure of the cooperative.  
The use of this tool reflects the grassroots organizing background of the founders, but 
also their method of solving conflicts.  
…there was one meeting in particular where I facilitated it and came up with a 
tool during the meeting to help get us, to help figure out what the structure and 
organization of the actual collective and business was going to be. And so how I 
lead that meeting was we had a whole bunch of sticky notes and markers and we 
had been talking about it for months and so people had this idea in their heads of 
how this would work… people just wrote down each component or idea that they 
had for the Public House on different little sticky notes. And then we grouped all 
of the similar ones together and that’s how we mapped out that we would have a 
workers collective and then we’d have membership, we’d have the 
publicity/marketing side, which at that point we called propaganda… and the 
product of that is how we came up with the manifesto, which was really helpful to 
get us all on a similar page. (Sean) 
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An interview with Patty reiterated the usefulness and lasting impact of this genre.  
There was a time when, we were like, “Okay, what all do we have to do?” There 
would be conversation, conversation, conversation… it was frustrating. Sean 
brought out like big pieces of paper and stuck them on the walls… And started 
visualizing it and it was, “That’s how you do this.” Seeing him do that, being able 
to, it’s a good thing to learn, when the group’s at an impasse, trying to make 
decisions and it’s very clear what decisions need to be made, but how to make 
them is unclear, or what they should be is unclear, that exercise of visualizing it 
for everyone so that conversation is clearly on a wall. (Patty) 
Sean’s collaborative activity is common in grassroots organizing to bring the group into 
agreement (see toolsforchange.org). The use of deliberative technologies is common in 
facilitation techniques like the Art of Hosting (Sandfort and Quick 5); however, it is unique that 
this tool was used to collaboratively make business decisions.  
Genres like this organizing tool was essential in the earliest stages of development where 
the Public House was a kind of horizontal utopia. Collaborative and participatory, the network 
hung together by their enrollments, including the recognition that using Sean’s tool together they 
had decided on the structure. While no one individual may have received 100% of what they 
wanted in through the process, enough people were satisfied that the group could agree and move 
beyond the impasse that Patty and Sean recalled.   
The use of the sticky notes and other tools show how genres evolved to create shared 
realities to enroll actors and establish links that held the group together (Winsor 2007). Applying 
a social approach to genres provides a framework for analysis of the role of texts in this “hanging 
together.” That is, looking at genres as social responses to typified social situations that are 
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stabilized-for-now shows that the genres they created were a response to the recurring situation 
of impasse and stabilized the group for coordinated action (Miller 1984; Winsor 2003, 2007). 
Organizational documents like manifestos, bylaws, and codes of conduct steadied the founding 
network long enough to open the business.  
The texts they created came to serve the group through interpretive processes. Almost as 
immediately as they had begun, they realized that though they each started with a dream, it may 
not have been a collective, shared dream. As Sean’s tool demonstrates, the genres they created 
enabled the group to move past their disagreements and open the business, but these 
disagreements did not disappear. Rather, they became embedded in the genres they were 
creating, which were in turn enrolled in the founding network.  
 
The Shape of the Network 
This founding network of Public House was responsible for imprinting not only the shape 
of the organization, but also the kinds of genres they would employ. Human actors in the first 
network (Group A in Table 1) were not entrepreneurs or even experienced bartenders. Sean and 
Will’s accounts of this network show many of the founding members were community 
organizers and their grassroots organizing background influenced the initial strategies for 
opening the bar—grassroots broadly defined as people without expertise, organizing from the 
bottom-up. That is, rather than starting the business with a conventional strategy of feasibility 
studies, market research, and start-up funds, Patty, Levi, Lucy, and Sean each recounted the 
earliest organizing texts from the DIY genre: flyering, knocking on neighbors’ doors, word-of-
mouth, and personal outreach.  
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 These earliest organizing efforts showed individuals enrolled into the founding network by 
social and political interests, linked through a narrative threading through Riverwest by 
neighbors, signs, artwork, meetings, potluck dinners, and other institutions. According to Sean, 
from the beginning, “it was more than just opening up a bar... it was this broader goal of using 
that to then fund other initiatives, organizations, projects...” That the business would be socially 
conscious is significant to understanding the motivations of the original founding group; that is, 
they were creating a business founded on a commitment to shared ownership and open, 
democratic participation.   
 These founding volunteers brought a particular expertise in organizing and quickly took on 
tasks like fundraising, drafting documents for the city, finding and securing a location, and 
capitalizing on volunteer labor. According to Levi and Robert, this social expertise coupled with 
their commitment to building a non-hierarchical collective led to a looser structure at the cost of 
ensuring certain important texts like employee wage guidelines or procedures were created at the 
start or within the first year of operation.  
 While this co-op eventually opened as the Public House, it was not always sure the new 
cooperative would in fact be a bar. When asked about the beginning, Patty said,  
…We decided to start a co-op and then we were like, “What kind of co-op?” 
What? “I want to start a business? What should it be?” is not a good way to start a 
business. Nobody ever in a million years would do that as a sole proprietor… You 
would never be like, “I want to start a business, now what should I become an 
expert at?”  
The organizers initially considered many businesses, including, according to Will, a bakery. 
However, Levi and Sean both said that once the idea of a bar was proposed (and the stories are 
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contradictory as to who and how it was first suggested) as a “fast way to make a lot of money,” it 
took off and other ideas were dropped. Levi, Patty, and Will agree the reason the bar idea took 
off was because it could be started with very little overhead beyond rent, licenses, and initial 
inventory, whereas a bakery would require significant start-up money for ovens and other 
equipment and “could possibly take years to turn a profit” (Will).   
 Initially, the group of friends used a variety of methods to enroll other actors from the 
neighborhood into the Public House network. Sean and Robert referred to the founding network 
members as a steering committee while Levi called it a proto-board. Whatever the term, unlike 
conventional entrepreneurs, this network did not enroll business experts, but rather invited 
residents of Riverwest using several grassroots organizing strategies to fundraise and to gather 
participants, publicly marketing their idea that people without expertise could actualize an 
organization to their own advantage. For example, Lucy happened to overhear a conversation at 
another cooperative in the neighborhood where she was working.  
I was working at the co-op in the food cafe at the time… (Sophia) was talking 
with someone else who was in the cafe and then she was like, oh yeah we are 
starting to talk about opening a co-op bar. And I was like, “Co-op bar? That’s 
awesome. When do you meet?” And she said the first meeting is literally the next 
day… I thought it sounded interesting and was there to overhear the conversation.  
Lucy’s involvement at an established cooperative positioned her as a candidate for enrollment in 
the new project. Importantly, she was not asked about her commitment, her skill set, or whether 
or not she could make a capital investment into the business. Rather, she was invited to 
participate because of her proximity and experience of working in a cooperative. Similarly, Levi 
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and his partner were invited to participate because they lived next to a business owned by one of 
the early organizers and expressed interest in cooperative development. 
Along with invitation, people became involved because of guerrilla marketing. Robert 
became interested through a neighborhood poster.   
The way I remember first learning about it was through a poster that was just 
hanging up on the street… And it was just a call to meet, which I thought was a 
really cool thing. Because I love co-ops but also because it was a new thing to get 
people into a room. As opposed to a particular kind of targeted invitation or more 
formal, that it was informal and everyone was invited.  
As these accounts show, the group did not enlist actors through orthodox means—by targeted 
recruiting efforts or invitations to experts—but rather through community organizing tactics. The 
underlying belief, according to Patty and Lucas, was that experts were not needed, but that 
through community knowledge, “looking around,” and “Google searches,” they could locate the 
necessary resources and knowledge to open a cooperative. Importantly, posters, often hand-
painted and tacked to a lamppost or taped in a window, invited a particular type of participant, 
one who: 
 Lived or traveled through the neighborhood on foot, bike, or skateboard (cars would 
move too fast to read the sings in the window) 
 Possessed some experience or interest in cooperatives and cooperative development 
 Had time or interest in developing a cooperative in the neighborhood 
Emblematic of the do-it-yourself focus of the earliest network, these posters resemble advertising 
for punk shows or other events scattering the Riverwest landscape. Use of this kind of artifact to 
strum up support for the project is an example of how the Public House sought and welcomed a 
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particular type of participant—the neighbor and the cooperator—and then together constructed 
Public House within the neighborhood of Riverwest. The collected data does not date back far 
enough to adequately examine the intention behind early recruiting, but what efforts like the 
posters and word-of-mouth point to—at least in these instances—is an early shaping of a 
network through targeted enrollment, selective inclusion.  
 Levi, Lucy, Lucas, Sean, and Patty described the early group as loosely organized, though 
not necessarily a group of friends, although there were friends in the group. Importantly, this 
group was not a monolithic group, but heterogeneous and linked together for a variety of 
reasons, with varying backgrounds and levels of expertise, as well as diverse—and sometimes 
competing—goals and motivations. Eventually, these differences grew to manifest themselves in 
the texts they produced.  
 
The Myth of the Public House: Exclusionary Practice Meets Democratic 
Principles 
While the Public House deployed the language of democracy in its workplace documents, 
publicizing the workplace as a horizontal, democratic space in which individual autonomy was 
encouraged, in practice, this promise fell short for some.  In some ways, the organizers fell short 
of living up to its promise because of failures in the texts—not necessarily through any one 
individual’s fault, but because the nature of the social arrangements present from the beginning 
was reified in the texts they produced and the kinds of genres they employed. Interviews, 
observations, and analyses show individual predictions and perceptions of the values and mission 
fell short of what genres were doing in practice. Meeting notes from a board training session in 
2013 put open decision-making at the heart of what made the Public House a cooperative:  
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What makes this a co-op? 
Member-owned 
Participation in governance (expected, and as a benefit) 
Decision-making by many, rather than one or a small few 
Democratic participation in decision making (Board of Directors)  
The capacity to participate in governance was integral to how people defined the Public House 
for themselves and marketed it to others. Nevertheless, this broad participation was largely a 
myth operationalized to move participants into productive consent, not because of nefarious 
aims, but because the relational nature of the Public House led to a lack of formalized 
mechanisms which could ensure access.  
As in many organizations, workplace genres at the Public House were socially 
constructed and continually reinterpreted. However, what made genres at the Public House 
unique was that a broader range of a limited subset of actors had textual access to governance; 
that is, some individuals freely created and interpreted genres, and this access translated into an 
ability to respond to—and even enact—change in the network.  
For example, while employed there as a bouncer, I grew unhappy with the position and 
decided to propose a new job description with greater responsibilities, while asking for a change 
in the wage: from a flat minimum wage to a higher wage, plus a percentage of tips. Using a 
traditional business communication genre (a formal proposal), my idea worked its way from an 
employee meeting to the Board for approval within a month’s time. My position as an insider 
granted me this access and the agency to write and circulate a proposal, bringing about 
organizational change. While theoretically, anyone could do the same, my position in the 
network created the conditions for me to feel I had an ability or even a right to do so.  
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Textual access was purportedly open to all participants. Everyone formally involved  
(as employees, long-term volunteers, or directors) had open access to all governing documents—
including all meeting notes—with editing permissions in Google Drive. In practice, however, 
fewer had the ability to change systems as the delineations of who could posit change was 
unclear in the documentation, instead prescribed by group norms. This is the heart of the 
contradiction: while the ability to access governance through genres seemed open to anyone, 
genre access was actually limited. Regardless, people continued to share the message of open 
governance with new workers upon hire, from the Board of Directors, through literature, and in 
meetings (including worker meetings, board meetings, and joint board and employee meetings). 
While founders and early employees accessed a robust network of people, genres, places, 
governance, etc., outsiders may have found it difficult to affect change. In other words, while 
employees, founders, members, and the marketing materials publicized the Public House as a 
porous, democratic system in which an individual could “own their work,” newcomers may have 
found it difficult to break through. The Public House was a very tight material and textual 
assemblage, and for those without access, enacting change—and perhaps meaningful 
participation in decision-making—may have been more difficult. If a new employee had 
attempted to re-write her job description as I had, she may have discovered she did not have the 
same ability to act. In this way, access may have been problematic for newcomers.  
As I seek to understand power at the Public House, I turn again to my research questions: 
1. How does a cooperative employ genres differently?  
2. What do these texts tell us about how power is distributed in a cooperative?  
3. How do the genres it employs affect organizational change?  
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One way this cooperative employed genres differently is that many people had textual access to 
the governance of the business, but only some people. In and of itself, this limitation is not 
unique. However, in this case, this limitation matters for two reasons: 1) the Public House 
positions itself as an open, democratic workplace where all people can openly particpate; and 2) 
people gave up other rewards in exchange for this democratic promise. While deploying 
rhetorics of empowerment, the Public House created minimum wage jobs on the basis that 
employees would be empowered to shape their job and own the directions of the business. At 
times, a contradiction existed between the stated values and the material realization of those 
values in individual lives. 
The practical limitation of access was a byproduct of the relational foundation of the 
network. Understanding how people enrolled in the network related to each other through the 
genres they have available or have created will help me to understand how textual access 
translated into power, in service to Question 2: What do these texts tell us about how power 
distributed in a cooperative organization? This allows me to explore the tension between 
democracy and exclusivity: e.g., one way power was distributed was through network positions 
enabled and constrained by genre access.  
In the sections below, I untangle the founding network—to use Spinuzzi’s metaphor 
(2007)—that made up the Public House in order to answer my research questions. First, I 
examine how friendship among founders and early members created a stabilized and exclusive 
network. Second, I look at an instantiation of their collaboration through genres. Finally, I tangle 
the pieces back together to look at the creation of the Public House as an assemblage of these 
two conditions.  
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Relational Underpinning Affected Textual Access 
Understanding how people related to each other will help me to understand how power is 
configured through the genres people created. Because an array of actors had access to 
governance documents and procedures, how these actors related to each other profoundly shaped 
how people accessed the Public House network. Applying Polletta’s theories of participation and 
drawing from her examples, I argue the participants at the Public House primarily related as 
friends and that the exclusionary nature of friendship was built into the workplace genres they 
created/interpreted.  
The way people related to each other profoundly affected the way they wrote and used 
texts, most notably the lack of formal mechanisms like policies and procedures. In the case of the 
Public House, if a friendship model of relationship was baked into the governance structure, then 
an already porous structure became even more permeable. There are at least two properties of 
this configuration at the Public House: informal, invisible power and the (inadvertent) exclusion 
of newcomers.  
Baldacchino and Hoffman locate two kinds of power that can operate in a cooperative 
like the Public House: informal and formal networks. Hoffman defines formalized power as an 
attribute of the job description, easily locatable and delimited.  
Formal position attributes characterize a job and its associated activities. Informal 
network connections comprise worker-made alliances throughout an organization 
(Kanter 1979). For example, position attributes might empower a dispatcher to set 
fellow workers’ staffing schedules; network connections might enable a cab 
driver to learn the priorities of the as-yet-unwritten monthly agenda. The former is 
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overt, easier to identify, and acknowledged by the organization’s members. The 
latter is more covert, less obvious, and invisible to some members. (55) 
The Public House was made of these informal networks of power with few formalized positions. 
Group norms, rather than formalized roles, dictated roles and rules. Some individuals were 
empowered to direct operations over others, even while the organization was ostensibly 
horizontal. For example, during my study, the mission statement was discovered to have 
changed. The change was noticed when the “old” mission statement appeared on an 
organizational document instead of the “new.” I could not find records of the re-writing 
procedures or conversation. Some individuals felt empowered to take autonomous action, while 
others did not, and who could take this kind of action was not outlined in the documentation.  
Murphy references to this blurring of lines between autonomous and consensus-based 
decision-making in the early meetings of the Public House. 
The meetings were pragmatic and featured consensus-based decision making 
wherever possible. At the same time, as cooperators assigned duties amongst 
themselves, they were explicit in stating that committees and board members 
should feel autonomous enough to make decisions that affected the whole 
enterprise, and their judgment would be trusted. These dual processes of 
autonomous decision-making and consensus-based decision-making were 
important to streamline the development of the enterprise. (41) 
Murphy mentions the lack of formalizing certain measures and the trust that allowed individuals 
to work autonomously: “Interestingly, the cooperators did not discuss in detail what 
differentiated an autonomous decision or a group decision, but to my knowledge this did not 
cause any problems” (41). The genres they were creating together lacked procedures, not needed 
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for people who were mostly friends or at least friendly. This lack of discussion on what 
necessitated autonomy or consensus indicates the informality in the network being built into the 
genres they produced (18). For example, for most of the Public House’s existence, there was no 
employee handbook, or a formal vacation or absence policy.  
At an organizational level, while the lack of mechanisms enabled some to act 
autonomously, the lack of formalized mechanisms and roles made discipline and accountability 
difficult. An example of this difficulty was the failure to intervene in disruptive behavior during 
meetings. One meeting I observed became quite heated. Feelings were hurt and the conversation 
circuitously devolved into bickering and side talk. People showed signs of frustration like eye 
rolling and exchanging glances. One director put her head in her hands (Observation Notes 
4/12/14). Disruptions and communication breakdowns like this example were not frequent, but 
common enough that it was not an anomaly. Even though this behavior was clearly disruptive to 
the group and the majority of the attendees were visibly frustrated, no one individual felt 
empowered to stop it. The agency to step into a dispute and disruption to the Board agenda was 
missing. Perhaps this absence was because of a diffusion of responsibility, linked in some way 
back to the way the group designed their governing texts, lacking formal mechanisms of control 
and roles. The deployment of social capital affected the direction of the organization, and, as 
shown in the incident above, directly influenced board outcomes.  
Employees often relied on their network positions and enrollments to blur the lines of 
compulsory action. For example, employees and directors often used the phrase “volen-tell” (to 
request someone to volunteer for a task, implying a lack of choice). One example of the volen-
tell network is the organizing of a large event, a Kentucky Derby party. Will asked, “Marco, will 
you have it clean and open at 10 am?” Marco says, “Yes.” Someone else asks, “Who is making 
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the flyer?” Ideas for the flyer then come from a few different people until the group decides on a 
design. A worker asks Dana to design the flyer and the tickets, and then ask the group, “Can you 
work a 9-hour shift if you come in at 1? Carol, can you stay late?” While Carol and Dana were 
free to say no, the capacity to ask for such a task was an example of unequal power distribution 
within the network.  
The informal friendship-unfolding of the network resonates with Polletta’s description of 
SDS and women’s liberation collectives. Problems that arise because of this kind of power 
distribution in the organizations Polletta studies also arise in the Public House. Polletta points to 
the primary instability of a friendship basis, which is not that it may be destabilized if friendships 
go sideways, but that friendship is necessarily exclusive.  
If friendship supplies the trust, mutual affection, and respect that facilitate fast and 
fair decisions, it also makes it difficult to expand the deliberative group beyond 
the original circle. Newcomers lack an understanding of the history of issues at 
stake as well as the idiosyncratic practices of this organization. Veterans may fail 
to inform or consult them. But newcomers' lack is affective as well as 
informational… they may find it difficult to secure the trust, respect, and 
solicitude that veterans enjoy. (140) 
The exclusionary qualities of friendship enabled a reliance on unspoken norms and etiquette in 
the absence of formalized roles that Murphy references, a quality that can undermine 
newcomers’ attempts to gain textual access to governance documents. While the language and 
the structures were there, how exactly to act and to access those structures may remain a 
mystery. 
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Despite the problems of exclusivity and diffusion of responsibility, after first organizing 
around friendship, reorganizing around something more formal can present difficulties, straining 
the unique bonds that made the organization successful in the first place, bonds that had become 
the foundation of decision-making and agreement (151-152). Difficulty in reorganization 
becomes more pressing as organizations grow, founders or experienced employees leave, and 
newcomers take their place. As we see in the next chapter, in the case of the Public House, broad 
network and generic textual change was possible only through disruption and upheaval.  
Polletta suggests that the exclusionary nature of friendship inevitably leads to fighting, 
stultification, and inaction (4). As we see in the Public House, the friendship model indeed 
precipitated many complications, compromises, and contradictions, perhaps ultimately 
undercutting many of the values the business was originally founded on.  
 
Textual Access Affected Participation 
One of my guiding questions was to find out how cooperatives employ genres differently 
from a conventional business. My study shows that in the case of the Public House, genres acted 
both as gatekeepers and as points of access by which some individuals could participate in 
governing the business.  
According to Winsor, “Texts function not only to record and share what is already known 
but, perhaps more importantly, to help writers and readers generate and agree on what counts as 
knowledge” (“Learning” 5). In the case of Public House, the question is not only what counts as 
knowledge, but also what counts as acceptable practice, how these decisions were made, and 
how they shaped the texts created. While many genres and authorized texts were created to fulfill 
the requirements of the state, in response to incidents, or to transfer knowledge, they lacked 
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official documentation outlining roles and means of decision making. Whatever the reason, by 
neglecting to create official mechanisms and texts that formalized how individuals could access 
the governance structures, they legitimized invisible, informal power negotiated through group 
norms, leaving newcomers and outsiders without access.  
During my study, they continually referenced the texts they had created. For instance, I 
witnessed more than one occurrence where a member of the board asked what the bylaws say 
about a particular issue, and another member pulled them up, looked them over, and read them 
aloud to the group. During meetings, volunteers or the secretary took exhaustive, detailed notes 
and, post-decision, another member wrote the account in a “Decisions Made” file. These texts 
recirculated for other uses as they pointed back to a decision, conversation, or negotiation.  
 One example of how textual access translated into access to power at the Public House is 
the use of Google Drive for note taking. During meetings, people often toggled between Google 
Drive and the verbal conversation. I observed more than one instance of participants writing to 
each other in the open document or texting about what is happening in the meeting, in private 
off-the-record chats. Friends talked to each other and made private observations outside the 
deliberations or even the knowledge of the group. Such observations and comments may have 
affected actions of the participants without knowledge of the rest of the group, problematizing 
the notion of consensus. 
This kind of side-chat alongside the authorized conversation was observed on several 
occasions. For instance, when the Board decided to fire an individual, Patty and I took notes. 
Patty blurted out the person was fired in what I thought was a harsh tone. I typed into the Google 
Doc something along the lines of, “Hey, ease up on it a bit” to let him down easy. Patty changed 
her behavior—the way she talked to the individual as the voice of the Public House—because of 
80 
my private comment, but no one else at the meeting besides us were aware I had even said 
anything. While technically anyone at the meeting could have logged in and participated in the 
note-taking, not everyone had a laptop or felt empowered to act. In this manner, access to Google 
Drive or group SMS threads enabled collaboration among select people, while those without it 
were left with only “authorized” messages. 
The incident report is another example of how textual access translated into the ability to 
act and affect change. A response to a perceived lack of accountability, the incident report was a 
flexible, open document created for reporting events that were deemed unacceptable by a worker 
or board member about other workers, board members, volunteers, patrons, or any individual 
that came into contact with the bar (Figure 4). The Board of Directors created it in response to a 
complaint. The incident report now hangs above the record player, near the laptop, a physical 
artifact circumscribing the reporter.  
As other genres created at the Public House, the incident report functioned in some ways 
like Winsor’s work orders in Writing Power. The incident report was an example of how those 
with textual access may affect change. Winsor described how work orders “jointly endorsed 
interpretations, came to represent facts” (61). Through the incident report, an event was 
rhetorically constructed for those with the capital to act upon it. Notes from the meeting that 
resulted in the creation of the incident report show it was created to monitor the bar. The 
intention behind the incident report was informative about problems at the bar, including 
drunken or disruptive behavior: “We don’t want to have a policy of no drinking at the bar, but 
maybe we could put together what we find acceptable... If the WC can’t police themselves, 
[then] we are in a funny spot because we are directly responsible for the bar but not day to day 
operations.” Also, sound and door workers should be able to make incident reports, that 
81 
“incident report should be anonymous and emailed,” and “stuff people say in community should 
also be filed. It should be anonymous, not punitive” (Special Meeting).  
 
 
Figure 2: Incident Report 
 
 
Here is an example of a filed report:  
What happened? 
A large brawl outside of the Public House around 1 AM…  
82 
Who was involved? 
Almost everyone that was inside Public House that night. Nobody is sure how it 
started, but it involved patrons, performers, (organizers), and staff interfered  
 
What we did at the time:  
Carol, on door, was the first outside to try to diffuse the situation. Sophia and I 
noticed upwards of 20 people all exit the bar at once, and Sophia immediately ran 
outside while I tended to the bar. I was trying to stop people from rushing outside, 
knowing it would escalate whatever situation was happening outside… Sophia, 
Carl, and… were outside trying to break up the fight. It was an unmanageable 
amount of people. I attempted to call the cops from inside, but our neighbors beat 
me to it… 
 
This is what we are going to do:  
Sophia, Carol, and I do not want Tuesdays to stop happening. We all think it is 
really important to have this type of event at the Public House. We came up with a 
few ideas to prevent things like this from happening: 
 
Hold a special meeting with Carl and Mel about why they want to be involved 
with Public House. Pinpoint whether they just want it to be a party for them each 
week, or if they want to be involved with the community building aspect… 
(“Incident Report”) 
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By framing the report with blanks for “what we did at the time” and “what we are going to do 
about it,” the incident report encouraged participants to narrativize the incident, granting agency 
to the individual making the report. The incident report itself listed the Worker Collective 
Google group as the intended recipient (a group that the Board of Directors can read and 
participate in as well). However, in practice, documents may be emailed to either the Board of 
Directors as a whole or to a singular individual perceived to have power to act upon it, typically 
a director, but at times, it could be an individual acting in a managerial capacity. The incident 
report could have resulted in an investigation leading to disciplinary action, though neither of 
these outcomes is prescribed in the incident report itself.  
 Because no mechanisms existed, individuals in the Collective needed a way for 
complaints to be formalized and acted upon. Mutual monitoring (Cheney 1995) necessitated a 
transcribed interpretation that could enact a certain event (investigation by powerful individuals). 
In lieu of an authorized point person to convey the story, this narrative was necessary to create a 
shared reality among those with access to it.  
One example of the way an incident report creates a shared reality is when an individual 
stole an item from the bar. The security camera video and witnesses recorded the misconduct. 
Like Winsor’s work order, it was the incident report that rendered the misconduct material, 
translating it to textual form upon which the Board of Directors could act. Once an action was 
inscribed, it gained a reality that can be acted upon by the Board (Latour 1999; Winner 1986). 
Latour addresses this phenomenon of translation in Pandora’s Hope. He writes:  
It seems that reference is not simply the act of pointing or a way of keeping on the  
outside, some material guarantee for the truth of a statement; rather it is our way 
of keeping something constant through a series of transformations. Knowledge 
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does not reflect a real external world that it resembles via mimesis, but rather a 
real interior world, the coherence and continuity of which it helps to ensure. (58)  
A chain of enrollments and inscriptions lent reality to a moment that previously no board 
member was aware of; it might as well not have existed. However, the word of witness + video + 
incident report gave the moment a reality that was hard to ignore. The incident report was a 
social action because it inscribed an event, giving the report exigency.  
 The incident report is one of many genres created at the Public House: a response to a 
need. It formalized mutual monitoring into generic procedure and, most importantly, formalized 
unequal access to give the report, and to respond to it. The incident report, which I was a part of 
creating, was the first step toward formalizing hierarchy at the Public House.  
 
 
Chapter 4: Dream and Death of a Dream: Rearrangement of an 
Organization through Rhetorical Strategy 
In Chapter 3, I demonstrated how compromises reified in the texts they produced 
together—texts most notable for their lack of prescriptions—opened the way for informal, 
invisible power for some and lack of access for others. In this chapter, I continue my 
examination of the Public House networks and the genres they instituted, extending my analysis 
from the relationships of the founding network to the genres they employed; contradictions and 
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tensions present in these original genres erupted into a full re-arrangement of the Public House 
network4.  
During my study, I witnessed changes that resulted in dramatic alteration of the structure 
of the Public House. To patrons and members, it may have appeared as if nothing had changed, 
but the organization had changed dramatically over a short period, so much so that the business 
may have been unrecognizable to those involved at the beginning. Individuals empowered by 
their textual access to governance documents enacted sweeping structural, network changes. 
Power shifted, from diffused power enabled by broad-yet-limited textual access, to a 
combination of these documents and—most importantly—power became vested in a particular 
network position: a manager. That is, rewriting organization documents alone did not resolve 
tensions, but rather change came by rewriting genres and by collectively instituting a new 
position who embodied this compromise. This change occurred by way of a handful of 
empowered individuals with textual access able to enact changes in network articulation, which 
resulted in significant philosophical and practical organizational changes, changes that ultimately 
brought the organization toward solvency.  
Because of the friendship relational model of the Public House covered in Chapter 3, 
documentation was informal, lacked protocols, and allowed for wide interpretation of 
procedures, opening the way for unequal distribution of power. The documentation the initial 
group of organizers produced enacted a compromise from two incommensurable philosophical 
perspectives of cooperative development: self-managed collectivity grounded in concern for 
autonomy, and procedural accountability grounded in concern for transparency and equitability. 
                                                 
 
 
4 Key details of these events have been changed or removed to better protect anonymity and to keep the focus on 
structural network concerns, rather than individual actors.  
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For example, in order to coordinate varying motives and values around labor, they created a 
genre called the Manifesto. At least partially a representation of their negotiation of differences, 
the Manifesto helped situate the Workers Collective within the Public House network; however, 
the Manifesto failed to resolve the two conflicting positions.  
Over time, the incommensurability of these positions developed into a rupture in the 
network, near insolvency, and finally, in a moment of top-down authority, a re-organization of 
the workers by the Board of Directors. The Board instituted a new managerial position, shifting 
the burden of negotiation between collectivity and the need for procedure, from a document to an 
individual. This new manager’s first act was to enroll a new prescriptive genre: an employee 
handbook, which superseded the Manifesto. Ultimately, these changes led to a showdown 
between the two perspectives, dramatized between a stalwart of the collectivity faction against 
the new managerial position. In the end, the new managerial model—with a stronger network 
and more actors enrolled—won out.   
Because of their access to governance, certain empowered individuals could pivot the 
business in a very short time. This unfettered access by a few resulted in a nimble organization, a 
quality ultimately responsible for its survival, even while compromising original intent of full 
democratic participation.  
 
Conflicts in Structuring the Public House: The Manifesto 
In this section, I examine the two incommensurable positions on cooperative 
development and their disagreements on how the Public House should be structured. In an effort 
to reach a compromise and coordinate action, they enrolled a document to concretize their areas 
of agreement. Called the Manifesto, this document failed to resolve at least two issues: their 
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reliance on momentum and friendship rather than stability, and the problem of the distribution of 
labor in the new network.  
 
Foundational Split: Two Perspectives at Odds 
The unequal access we saw in Chapter 3 was largely due to ambiguous documentation 
lacking formal mechanisms, enabling invisible power networks to flourish at the expense of 
access and transparency. Here, I argue divisions in the founding network present at the beginning 
were ultimately to blame for this lack of formal mechanisms that allowed exclusionary practices 
to be concretized into organizational texts. These divisions were the result of divergent 
viewpoints on how the Public House should be structured.  
Interviews reveal at least two visions of ethics on structure. The first group of individuals 
shared an organizing philosophy rooted in the do-it-yourself culture of the neighborhood. When 
asked why more deliberate management mechanisms were not put in place at the beginning of 
the bar or why expertise was not sought, Patty ascribed it to a DIY ethic along the lines of 
grassroots activism, punk music, basement shows, zines, and anti-consumerism. 
The point of anything is to do it. You don’t need to ask permission to do things; 
you don’t need necessarily to have any expertise… Coming out of that sort of 
cultural space and going into “How are we going to actualize a democratic 
economy? What does that look like? Do we need experts? Hell no we don’t.” 
That’s the attitude. Like, “Let’s start a co-op. Okay, what kind of co-op? Let’s 
start a bar. Alright, let’s do it.”   
Robert and Levi agree with Patty when she identified a DIY ethic with an anarchist attitude, the 
heart of which is an undaunted belief in self-management. As this DIY ethic is antithetical to 
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conventional management expertise, and more in line with anarcho-syndicalist self-management 
as discussed in Chapter 1, I will refer to this model for business management as “self-
management” for shorthand.  
Sean, Robert, Lucy, and Patty also identified a second position was from some of the 
people with organizing and/or cooperative experience, who were familiar with the strictures of 
running an organization and who had previously helped build or manage a cooperative. This 
second position is responsible for what has been referred to by Robert and Levi as “process:” 
enrolling into the founding network a range of procedural genres including transcriptions,  
organization charts, governance calendars and other texts associated with the formal process and 
structuring techniques. Individuals in this group had been involved in a range of organizing 
efforts, from environmental and social issues to cooperative info-shops, housing, and policy 
efforts. They brought theoretical knowledge and hands-on experience to the foundational 
network of the Public House. I refer to this party as “process-oriented.”  
Texts created during the founding meetings enacted tensions between these two 
approaches. The best example is the text entitled “Manifesto.” By naming it a type of political 
declaration in militaristic typeface on the cover, the authors frame their project as political and 
radical. A look inside, however, shows a rather conventional business document, save for the 
“Propaganda Committee,” a tongue-in-cheek label revealing members saw this document as 
promoting a particular political perspective with street militancy.  
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Figure 3: Cover of Manifesto 
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Figure 4: Table of Contents 
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In stark tension to the radicalism conveyed by the cover, opening the Manifesto reveals the Table 
of Contents. The reader encounters a conventional, standardized demarcation of topics, structural 
and budgetary in nature, documents that enabled the compromise toward collaboration and 
coordinated action, according to Sean whose sticky notes tool resulted in the Manifesto.  
 The Manifesto reified the tensions between the self-management faction and the process-
oriented faction. Beyond the cover, the document revels what people believed they were making: 
a well-organized activist organization for some, and a political DIY project for others. The 
resulting document is a compromise between the two.  
Interviewees reported some organizers left as the cost of compromise became too great, 
but many who were bothered viewed the document as a concession they could work with. 
Ultimately, however, it was a fantasy of collaboration. Given the disciplinary problems inherent 
in the informal structure and the incommensurability of the two philosophies, noticeably missing 
was anything along the lines of regulatory measures, perhaps because discipline was too 
contentious of a point and brought to light the ruptures in the framework most clearly, leaving 
the organizers unable to reconcile.  
In contrast to Murphy’s description of the first organizing meetings (41), Sean, Robert, 
and Levi recounted how often the opposing organizers clashed as the self-management 
philosophy butted against formalization and implementation of configuring mechanisms. Self-
management advocates saw those elements as domestication and contrary to worker autonomy. 
At moments of conflict, the self-management group would often win due to vocal and intractable 
positions, according to interviews with Sean, Robert, and Lucy. In interviews, process-focused 
organizers pointed out times they made concessions in an effort to focus on the necessary actions 
at hand, like buying a license, dealing with the property owner, etc. In these moments, practical 
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details took precedence over less immediate but perhaps equally important decisions like 
attendance policies or consensus process, stances that were, according to Robert, believed to be 
contrary to self-management from the start.  
Lucy mentions that when tensions rose over an issue not important to you, stepping out of 
the way was expedient, but that this giving over allowed for others to control or dominate a 
process, ultimately shaping the organization.  
I feel like so many people involved are just nice fucking people, not that they 
aren’t strong or not willing to fight for shit, but it’s just not worth it to deal with 
the negativity and the backlash from standing up to someone. It allows people 
who are more controlling to control because the other people are like, “Okay, I’ll 
just keep going and deal with my own shit.” When the potential consequences are 
nastiness and negativity and it’s something you don’t feel strongly about, it’s just 
easier not to participate. The people who are more forceful are the ones who are 
going to get their way because the rest of us, while we care, in all these little bitty 
things, it’s just not worth it. 
About the self-management roots of the Public House and the conflict between process-oriented 
people and people less interested or resistant to process, Robert said,  
This isn’t an anarchist project, it’s a participatory democracy. I think part of it is 
…any semblance of structure or order is the Man, and the idea of being process-
less and being flexible and rolling with it and it happening in this organic way is a 
really great idea, idealistically, but I don’t think that… I think that it is too 
important to think about things like safety and respect and inclusion as far as 
voices silenced, I think that process is part of the joy of decision making. The 
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learning process, the leadership development and all of that, and what I imagine 
this anarchist free-form “unprocess” is an opportunity for power to be exerted in 
unhealthy ways. 
In line with Freeman’s “tyranny of structurelessness” theory, Robert argued “free-form 
unprocess” in an organization opening the way for power to be exerted upon others. In reflection, 
Robert identified the lack of structure and relationship foundation as a point of weakness. 
If we could go back I think we would spend a lot more time preparing a little bit 
more infrastructure before opening because I think a lot of the challenges that 
have happened at the Public House through its opening has really been focused on 
some of that infrastructure not being in place… and folks relying on relationships, 
which is important, but sometimes can’t necessarily sustain other kinds of 
challenges. And can sometimes be a hindrance to efficiency and process and 
success.   
During interviews, several participants expressed the belief that the absence of process was 
demonstrated by a lack of enrolled texts outlining disciplinary mechanisms, texts that may have 
allowed the group to handle personnel problems in a non-reactive way, rather than to address 
them ad hoc.  
 The Manifesto failed to address the tensions it embodied. Below, I show two 
manifestations of the rifts the Manifesto failed to address, which precipitated a destabilization of 
the network: the reliance on momentum, and the issue of the distribution of labor in the network.   
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Reliance on Momentum Rather than Stability 
In the heady rush to open the business, details of policies had to wait. A reliance on 
momentum rather than organizational genres helped to destabilize the network. Despite tensions 
in the network, the Public House opened in less than two years. According to Levi, forward 
momentum carried them through early disagreements and philosophical conflict. Levi, Lucy, and 
Sean agreed early momentum was spent building a business rather than focusing on process and 
structures like how agreements would be made, what constitutes an agreement, and other details; 
energy was spent on the short-term goal of opening. For Levi, this focus was a strategic use of 
time.  
A lot of groups, when you are founding something you are so involved in starting 
it up you don’t worry about the process-y things. Which is good and bad. I have 
been in groups that tried to do the process-y things and then that’s all you do, you 
never actually start anything. Because now we have all this organizational method 
for a thing that doesn’t exist yet. Because we never started it. You can spend a 
year doing that, or you can spend a year starting something and then realize you 
have no process. That can be problematic, but if you started it and then you go 
back and make a process, it’s a pain in the butt but you can do it. Whereas if you 
have a process and no group, that will fizzle out and then you don’t have a group.  
Forward momentum was expended starting the bar, meeting licensing deadlines and other 
essential tasks, and not reflecting on what or how internal processes were developing among the 
group to create stability.  
Perhaps one reason these texts were not created was that, unlike the Manifesto, which 
represented compromises on the structure, the divisions on discipline were too deep to inscribe 
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compromise. Once this “opening” momentum is spent, fissures that were already present began 
to rupture.  
 
Distribution of Labor in the Network 
Contention over volunteer versus paid labor arose from the arguably inherent 
incompatibility between self-management and processed-focused organizers. Sean mentions part 
of the group especially wanted the Public House to be involved in job creation, rather than being 
volunteer run. Levi and Sean both recounted that some members believed a volunteer workforce 
was the only way for the business to be sustainable, at least in the beginning. This tension over 
labor would be a recurring issue as the network grew in size.   
As people began to rely more and more on the material reality of the bar, labor became an 
even bigger point of conflict. Initially everyone involved was a volunteer. As bartenders, they 
received tips. Levi said this decision was made so that the bar could open without the overhead 
of paying employees.  
When we first started out the board members were going to be volunteer 
bartenders and we’ll live on tips… Legally you can’t have unpaid workers getting 
tips.  
This introduction of wages brought to light a pivotal conflict inside the network between actors 
who earned a wage and those who decided on a wage (some individuals fell into both 
categories). Levi stated that once the bar became more polarized between directors and 
employees, the rift deepened.  
We had not started out with a plan that we are going to pay this wage, we started 
off like, it’s just us and we are doing it for volunteer-sake because we want to get 
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this thing off the ground. And then, no we have to pay ourselves for tax purposes. 
So that $3.33 an hour was the least we could pay ourselves… And then a year 
later some of the bartenders were like, we are only earning 3.33 an hour and that’s 
terrible, the worst possible wages you can make, this is ridiculous… So there was 
some internal debate going on about is our social responsibility to be open and to 
be a space in the neighborhood? Is our responsibility to pay our workers a decent 
wage? What is a decent wage?  
Unlike a conventional business where, at such an impasse, a CEO, manager, or sole proprietor 
would default as the head of the organization and make the decision, at the Public House, texts 
and the over-arching narrative of cooperative ownership held them together. Texts like the 
Manifesto, bylaws, codes of conduct, and other co-created texts enrolled individual founders 
long enough to coordinate action, but failed to address deep contradictions and tensions the texts 
embodied. Already, the story was beginning to fray around the edges.  
 
Workers Collective: An Uneasy Network Compromise 
The Workers Collective was a sort of compromise between self-management and the 
process-oriented camps. The Manifesto both created and legitimized the Worker Collective 
within the Public House network, additionally legitimized through other co-created texts like the 
mission statement and bylaws. As the employee branch of the Public House, it evolved to 
include all paid employees, contractors, and volunteers. As Levi pointed out, at the formation of 
the bar, individuals volunteered to staff the bar. Over time, the positions developed into 
permanent paid positions (Sean, Levi) and these positions were inscribed into a document 
entitled “Job Descriptions & division of labor for the Public House Workers’ Collective.” Each 
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position was occupied by an individual who had been working at the bar for some time, in some 
cases since it opened. Levi points out that only people with prior experience in these jobs filled 
the finance and managerial positions.  
 
Workers Collective Texts 
According to Sean and Levi, many of the earliest organizers of the Public House felt that 
having a separate, self-managing collective aligned with the bylaw value-statement of “collective 
worker management.” Cultivate Coop explains the difference between a worker cooperative and 
a worker collective. 
A worker collective is a particular kind of worker cooperative. A worker 
collective adheres to the same cooperative principles as does a worker 
cooperative. However, worker collectives also adopt a non-hierarchical (often 
called a “flat” or “horizontal”) management structure. This means that all workers 
are equal co-managers: nobody has un-recallable decision-making power or 
authority over another worker. Smaller decisions may be made by individuals, 
department teams, or committees, but all collective members participate in both 
major management and governance decisions. (cultivate.coop)  
Several documents enrolled the position of the Workers Collective within the structure of the 
Public House. These texts are important in understanding the parameters and responsibility of the 
Workers Collective to the Board of Directors and vice versa. Another text that supported the 
Workers Collective is the organizational chart in the Riverwest Public House Board Manual.  
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Figure 5: Structure Chart from Board Manual, p. 18 
 
According to this model, the Workers Collective consisted of bartenders and “auxiliary 
positions: events, inventory, finance, and Fancy Pants (“Workers Collective Intro to New 
Hires”). Each auxiliary position was decided through group agreement and transcribed in “Job 
Descriptions & division of labor for the RWPH Workers Collective,” formalizing the positions 
into the structure of the Workers Collective and into the overall structure of the Public House.  
 
Network Positions 
These four positions together formed a general manager. All necessary managerial tasks were to 
be covered by the four. Out of all of these positions, no one had unrecallable authority over 
another (cultivate.coop; Zeuli and Cropp 37). The formalized descriptions, boundaries, and 
duties of each were clearly bounded and transcribed, which became a circulating artifact within 
the network. The Fancy Pants role evolved to be a catch-all position, intended to catch loose ends 
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and to “bottom-line,” that is, to ensure tasks were completed (Board of Directors; Workers 
Collective). The title Fancy Pants was chosen over “manager” or “lead,” intending to subvert 
some of the authority of a bottom-liner. According to Sean, the term Fancy Pants was a ludic jab 
at the authority granted to a manager.  
My recollection is that it was Sophia who first said it and did so tongue-in-cheek, 
mocking how we were going to have a manger-like roll despite the fact we were a 
workers collective. I think it stuck because, as a workers collective, we didn't 
want to acknowledge fully that we were implementing managerial structure but at 
the same time did recognize that we needed leadership from someone with 
bartending experience (most bartenders were newbies when we first opened). So 
we just made light of the position and continued calling Xavier’s position fancy 
pants.  
What “bottom-lining” means is spelled out in the job description for Fancy Pants: “They will be 
tasked with overseeing the bar as a whole and is the “go-to bartender for training, quality control, 
and day-to-day personnel issues or questions” (Job Descriptions & division of labor for the 
Public House Workers’ Collective”). 
The term “bottom-liner” or “bottom-line” is a colloquialism that seems to mean the one 
who makes sure it happens, the one who will take responsibility if it doesn’t (Board of Directors; 
Workers Collective). A Workers Collective with a lead or pseudo-manager introduces the tension 
from the start, and in a sense is a step away from collectivity. At best, it institutes hybridity 
between horizontal and vertical structures.  
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Figure 6: Founding Network 
 
Figure 6 shows the network at the end of the first stage of organizing: the Workers Collective 
was in place, along with several key texts. Included in this network is an actor who will come to 
embody the philosophy of worker autonomy and collectivity: Sophia. A founder dedicated to 
self-management, Sophia comes to play a role in the reorganizing of the Public House.  
At the end of the first phase of organizing—after establishing the organization with the 
city and within the neighborhood, and fulfilling the requirements of Wisconsin law—the network 
included the Workers Collective, founders, and texts, hanging together through agreements and 
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exchanges. Though these links were at times tenuous, the network was stabilized enough that the 
organization could achieve common goals such as fundraising, opening, and operating.  
 
Re-organization: The Destabilized Network Manages Innovation 
As the network grew, it gradually added necessary texts that stabilized the organization 
including bylaws, job descriptions, and an organizational chart. As new actors came in, the 
network shifted to include new positions and new links between new texts and human actors. 
Because of the lack of disciplinary regulation, exacerbated by the tensions between self-
management and process, managerial oversight of the day-to-day operations of the bar—
tentatively embodied in the Fancy Pants position—deteriorated and links began to fray. As new 
actors were enrolled and other actors left the network, tensions that had existed since inception 
began to re-emerge within the stabilized-for-now texts and within the network.   
While texts reified the Workers Collective within the structure of the Public House 
overall, there were few internal texts within the Workers Collective. Without formal structure 
and other mechanisms like evaluations, peer review, clear protocols for a rule infraction, or even 
a general code of conduct, the few extent workplace procedures in place could be difficult to 
enforce. As business increased and expanded, founders left to pursue other projects and 
employees arrived who did not have the same relationship to the texts as the founders who 
drafted them, for whom they represented a compromise. Without founders to re-inscribe intent 
continually, interpretations began to shift. Once again, the lack of texts outlining procedures and 
formal mechanisms of power led to disruptions in the network. Only this time, people began to 
notice.  
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Destabilizing the Network: Failures in the Texts 
It is difficult to trace where it began, but by March 2014, changes in the network brought 
tensions to a head. The failure to create texts outlining formalized roles and procedures of the 
network, and an increasing reliance on the Fancy Pants to interpret and implement the extant 
informal and formal procedures, leading to the re-emergence of disconcordance between self-
management and process perspectives and an increasingly destabilized network. The Workers 
Collective began to experience failure indicated by four events. 
First, Lucas, acting as Fancy Pants, noticed that money was missing from the safe and 
reported it. This information was sent out via email to the Board of Directors for response and 
action (Lucas).  
Second, the energy company almost disconnected power for lack of payment. A 
happenstance meeting between Lucas and the energy company stopped the disconnection (Lucas, 
“A Couple of Issues…”). A disconnection would have been disastrous to a business with a razor-
thin financial margin.  
 Third, rent was past due. The newly signed and negotiated lease stated checks must be 
sent before the first of the month in a three-month batch, post-dated. The first batch was not sent 
on time and therefore rent was late, putting the Public House in violation of a newly signed, 
renegotiated lease. The Board of Directors, the legal representatives of the business, were not 
aware of this failure until the property owner contacted them through email (Emily, “Re: A 
Couple of Issues…”)  
Fourth, in addition to the financial management problems, inventory was suffering. When 
the bar is short on supplies, Lucas and other bartenders paid retail prices for beer, liquor, or other 
bar supplies, a costly fix that eliminates profit. While running out of critical inventory, other 
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inventory ran amok. A critical item missing from the job descriptions, and not designated to be 
anyone’s job, was a tracking system for the inventory of the bar including liquor, beer, wine, soft 
drinks, and snacks. Additionally, the inventory position was not in communication with the 
finance system, but Fancy Pants communicated with both independently, attempting to fill in the 
gaps of all the positions. The slippage in inventory was also costly. The Fancy Pants, who has 
many years of bar manager experience, resolved to tighten inventory, filling gaps in job 
descriptions and accountability. He noted part of the problem was the formalized job roles were 
unclear:  
The problem is that we have redundancies - multiple people getting paid to do the 
same job - the job isn’t really getting done and we’re paying twice for it. That’s 
fiscally totally unsound. (Board of Directors) 
In each case, Lucas must either act autonomously, contrary to the self-management culture of the 
bar, or allow failure.  
Lucas filled multiple job duties, an indication that job descriptions were inadequate 
without disciplinary mechanisms or structure in place. In the case of Sophia, the lack of 
formalized description made it difficult to assess the efficacy of the position. For example, there 
was confusion over whether or not the finance position required QuickBooks entries. Without a 
car, she was unable to make daily deposits. Lucas picked up delivery of the deposits, but they 
were made infrequently, which made tracking money difficult and left large sums in the bar. To 
add to the confusion, in violation of the bylaws, the treasurer position was vacant since the last 
treasurer resigned suddenly. Additionally, there was no real-time tracking of hours for the 
auxiliary positions.  
104 
The situation became critical as the bar quickly lost money and became reliant on well-
attended events to carry the bar from month to month, and eventually week to week. The bar was 
on the edge of insolvency, barely able to pay monthly bills, and then paychecks. In a desperate 
move, employees volunteered to give up paychecks until the situation was resolved.  
Frustrations built to the boiling point: lack of payment of bills, lack of understanding of 
the finances, lack of control of inventory, and lack of real-time tracking of working hours (Board 
of Directors; Special Finance Meeting). Meeting notes from the months before the change 
reflected their deep anxiety: “Financial situation is dire,” “We had a record February in terms of 
sales but came out with a $50 profit,” “Put positive energy out there even if we’re freaking out 
internally” (Board of Directors).  
Sensing the threat to the existence of Public House, the Board of Directors instituted a 
series of changes, exerting a rare moment of top-down authority upon the Workers Collective, 
suspending collectivism and participatory management, ultimately unveiling the schism that had 
been present since its founding.  
 
Stabilizing the Network: Reorganization 
With the help and consent of the Workers Collective, the Board terminated all positions 
and consolidated them into two positions: Front-of-the-House, and Back-of-the-House. These 
two positions were understood as temporary fixes for a nine-month period, until the financial and 
managerial fractures could be resolved. All current Workers Collective members were open to 
apply. The Board hired Lucas as the Front-of-the-House and Will as the Back-of-the-House, a 
financial-focused managerial position. On April 26, 2014, the new job descriptions and positions 
were voted on and accepted. When asked about the problem with asymmetry power relations 
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between a general manager and the Workers Collective, the notes on that day recorded Will’s 
response. 
Will argues that the Workers collective has no shortage of great goals and great 
ideas, but where we need the GMs is to enforce these. Workers collective decides 
the what, and the GMs decide the how. We are creating these jobs so that in 9 
months everybody has clarity about how everything works/needs to work.  
Will’s response points toward the general acceptance that there was a need for “enforcement” 
and “clarity,” a general acceptance that self-management had failed. Previously, the prevailing 
philosophy of management was free-form, open, and dynamic; now, the organization moved 
toward bureaucratization and centralization, a resounding rebuff of self-management in favor of 
process.  
Critically, the organizational narrative shifted to support this change in philosophy. The 
stories the Public House once told about itself shifted from open support of the self-management 
perspective to the idea that a process perspective would better direct the organization.  
One example of this shift is how bylaws came to be re-read in service of the 
reorganization. Whereas before, as embodied in the bylaws, collectivity was said to be valued 
very highly and centralization of authority was resisted. Several board members and employees 
voiced concern that instituting the change in focus from a collective to a managerial structure 
necessitated a bylaw change (Board of Directors). According to Wisconsin law, however, bylaw 
changes would need to be voted on by the membership (Wisconsin Statute §185.07). This vote 
did not occur; rather, the bylaws come to be reinterpreted to support the reorganization. This 
reinterpretation occurred across several organization documents and their internal narrative. That 
is, in support of network changes, the narrative shifted from a refusal to compromise on values of 
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collective management even if they closed their doors, to doing whatever it took to keep the bar 
open, even if it meant compromising on values and ideals it started with. This shift was 
necessary to bring about stability. The rifts between the self-management and process regimes 
was untenable.  
 The network morphed from a structure of self-management to include new systems of 
oversight management; documents came to be interpreted in light of the changes made.  
 
 
Figure 7: Changes in Network Enrollments 
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Figure 7 shows the transition of the Public House network, with multiple texts and individuals 
enrolled. Now a robust network, supplying multiple jobs, stability became a critical need. At this 
time, Sophia’s enrollments were still intact, even as the narrative shifted. 
 
Transmission of Change: Employee Handbook 
So what happened to the Manifesto? During this period of dynamic philosophical and 
structural change, what happened to the document that had once been the cornerstone of 
compromise at the Public House?  
 By the time of my study, the Manifesto had fallen out of use. In fact, my research brought 
the existence of the Manifesto to the attention of some the current employees and directors who 
were previously unaware of its existence. In the passage of time from the foundation of the 
Public House, where the Manifesto served as the keystone of coordinated action, many 
supportive texts had become enrolled in the network. Between these supportive texts, oral 
histories, and organizational narratives, the Manifesto was no longer looked to as a point of 
cohesion. As the Manifesto did not address disciplinary concerns, it provided no insight to the 
current problems. Concurrently, as the Manifesto embodied the compromises from the founding 
group, as it fell aside, so did the social capital of the founders embedded in it.  
 As Front-of-the-House, with full board support, Lucas decided to create an employee 
handbook, a normalizing document that would have been unthinkable in the wild hay days of 
self-management. The employee handbook, codifying expectations for work, concretized an 
asymmetrical power dynamic earliest proponents of self-management would have objected to 
resolutely.  
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 At this point, the mantra “for the good of the co-op” and a drive toward solvency 
becomes a force of change and a point of cohesion for the group. Rather than arguing over small 
details, as Robert and Lucy pointed out, agreements formed around best practices for the 
cooperative, even at the expense of ideals present at its founding. The employee handbook 
represented this cohesion.  
  
Figure 8: Worker Handbook Cover 
109 
The cover is noticeably different from the Manifesto, which recalled stenciled, radical and 
militant street fliers. Instead, the font type is rounded and minimalist. The new logo includes the 
raised fists of the old logo, but with a more polished look. Rather than a banner behind the hands, 
there is a circle. The handbook is bound in a three-ring binder for easier addendum. Absent is a 
Table of Contents because, unlike the Manifesto, the handbook was intended to be an evolving 
document and not a concretization of compromises born through conflict.  
The second page is a welcome with armed revolutionary figures, calling to mind the 
Zapatistas or an anarchist black bloc. In an almost schizophrenic manner, this image and the 
emphasis on collectivity in the passage hark back to the self-management focus of the earliest 
organizers, organizers who identified as anarchists and radicals.  
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Figure 9: Welcome 
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The explanatory tone of the passage serves multiple purposes: not only does it introduce new 
hires, but it also persuades readers to an authorized vision of the bar. In his work on narrative and 
organizational change, Faber remarks, “Each organization is a constant site of discursive 
struggle” (103) and “…narrative acts as an instrument of power within organizations as 
predominant narratives structure how people view their organizational environment” (31). Words 
like “we,” “us,” and “ourselves” identify the reader as part of the Public House. The passage 
mentions two goals at the bottom of the welcome: a source for a right answer and consistency.  
 In stark contrast to self-management (i.e., workers as a resource and the do-it-yourself 
ethic of the bar), “Welcome” functions as a normative text, a precursor for the rest of the 
document.  
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Figure 10: Checklist 
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This example of a checklist, one of many found in the handbook, describes the correct 
procedures for opening the bar, unveiling the normative nature of the handbook. The passive 
voice and implied “you” veils writers’ authority. Lucas’s extensive experience as a bartender and 
as Fancy Pants, coupled with the authority granted him by the Board, enabled the creation of a 
top-down document systematizing one particular procedure over another. Other writings in the 
document did include procedures drafted by someone else (me), the inclusion of which was a 
decision made by the book’s creators.  
 Just as the Manifesto enacted the tensions within the bar, so the handbook enacted the 
recent tensions between worker collective management and top-down management, between 
self-management and process. Like the Manifesto, the employee handbook represented 
compromises to facilitate coordinated action. Unlike the Manifesto whose purpose was 
conciliatory (Sean), this handbook was normative. Uncomfortable with complete top-down 
authority, the Welcome brings up collectivity and shared governance, while the checklists harken 
a systematizing of policy incompatible with self-management—unless the workers co-create 
those policies. In this case, however, authorized by the Board of Directors (“Leadership Meeting-
Divvyed Job Descriptions Updated 4.26.14”), Lucas created those policies and instituted them 
via the handbook, ultimately vastly improving procedures and practices.  
 The handbook came to replace the Manifesto, which resolutely ceased to be enrolled in a 
network. The handbook became the new agreed-upon text that enabled coordinated action.  
 
Dismissal of a Founder and Completion of Change 
As the network changed, so actors came to relate to each other differently. The new 
handbook and other peripheral texts came to be enrolled or reinterpreted in service of changes in 
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enrollments. This change is most demonstrated by a defining governance event: the removal of a 
founder, Sophia.  
In a collective, termination is difficult because of the diffusion of responsibility into a 
crowd. How did a democratic group collectively fire one of their own? Answer: It was 
enormously difficult, but the underlying narrative of the necessity to keep the business open (“for 
the good of the co-op”) countered the loss of friendships and motivated the group to coalesce and 
fire an individual. For the fired individual, it not only leads to a loss of material goods, but also 
to a sense of betrayal. One of the effects of having a manager formally authorized to move into a 
network position is that a manager can take on the uncomfortable issue of discipline. For the 
Public House, having a Front-of-the-House manager resolved the diffusion of responsibility in a 
self-management system. Without this position, termination may not have happened at all.   
Only one other individual has been fired during this research: a new hire who assaulted a 
customer. The notes state:  
This person’s employment is terminated, but they may reapply after 6 months. 
This is a serious incident, and the board is making the decision not because the 
workers collective failed but because it is a legal liability and explicitly in 
violation of our policies intolerant of violence. (Board of Directors)  
Up until the impending termination, this is the only event on record.  
In the process of the Worker Collective network changes, an incident happened involving 
a founder. As a founder associated with the DIY self-management faction, Sophia held authority 
in the organization as a long-time employee, a founder, and a person with a large network of 
enrollments. Members of the Workers Collective, including myself, made formal complaints 
about her actions, understood by some to be disruptive.  
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Lucas’s and Sophia’s authority were in conflict. Though complaints had occurred in the 
past, this event was handled dramatically different because of the shift of authority between 
invisible/informal and visible/formal power and because policies had begun to be codified. 
Because of her position, described by Marco and Lucy as “founder,” Sophia operated with an 
invisible power, giving her more agency than others had. The informal, loose social structure of 
the Public House allowed Sophia to operate within this invisible power, which, in part, protected 
her job and gave authority to her words, even when they were unpopular.  
With support from the Board of Directors, Lucas was given a formal role and formal 
authority within the Workers Collective. This authority was demonstrated when the Board turned 
to him with questions during a crisis; his position to speak and make changes without talking to 
someone else about it, and his posture at the table during a meeting showed Lucas assumed 
responsibility for certain tasks. Once the Board of Directors selected Lucas to be the arbitrator of 
discipline, his formalized authority and informal authority like Sophia’s were in conflict. Lucas 
had formalized authority through the Board and in writing and because of effective changes he 
made on his own initiative, was recognized as legitimate by the Workers Collective and the 
Board. In these ways, Lucas grew in authority. On the other hand, the old order of self-
management diminished as the Workers Collective and the Board came to accept and institute 
formalized offices, authority, and structure.  
Sophia’s invisible power was on the downslope at the same time Lucas’s was on the 
upswing. Lucas’s capacity to enroll many actors created a stable and powerful position. When 
the inevitable moment came when Sophia’s invisible, informal power came into conflict with 
Lucas’s visible, formalized power, Lucas was in a position of authorized power. Sophia lacked 
the linkages to be re-enrolled in the network.  
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In only a few months, Lucas instituted structure that previously did not exist and he did it 
by positioning himself rhetorically, enrolling other actors through the creation of the employee 
handbook, making withdrawals on the authority that the Board had given him, and enacting that 
authority into the habits of the workplace. Leveraging power in this way, Lucas also affected 
change in personnel.  
 Sophia was a founder who at times conflicted with other founders and with certain texts 
like the newly adopted job description, as well as the incident report, of which more than one 
were filed against her, including one by me. Sophia was not enrolled with a job description as—
unlike the other positions—the finance position job description was never written into “Job 
Descriptions & division of labor for the RWPH Workers’ Collective.” Still, Sophia had enough 
strong enrollments that regardless of conflicts, she was continually enrolled in the networks 
through multiple translations of interests. Over time, as the network and translations shifted, she 
had fewer enrollments and eventually found herself displaced from the network. No longer re-
enrolled, Sophia was terminated from her position. Though Sophia was in conflict from the 
beginning with some actors including nonhumans and humans alike, as long as she had 
enrollments, she was included in the network. Once those enrollments fell away, she was 
excluded from the network, shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Dissolution/Remaking of Network 
 
This is where the contradictions in philosophy come to a head. Lucas and Sophia each embodied 
the conflicted perspectives of the Public House; their conflicts dramatized the philosophical 
schizophrenia of the structure. Sophia’s firing is a resounding rejection of the self-management 
philosophy, at least temporarily.  
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Reinterpretation and Change in the Workers Collective 
The transformation at the Public House has resulted in a total overhaul of the structure of 
the Workers Collective. In addition to eliminating positions, decision-making power was 
consolidated into the hands of two people who, in effect, had autonomy to make decisions 
without input from the Workers Collective. For example, whereas in the past, hiring decisions 
were made jointly between HR, the Fancy Pants, and the Workers Collective, and approved by 
the Board of Directors, the Front-of-the-House could hire without input from others and 
implement sweeping changes without approval or discussion from the Collective. These acts 
created a hierarchy, a vertical accountability between the workers and the Front-of-the-House 
and Back-of-the-House. If Front-of-the-House and Back-of-the-House could both command, but 
not be commanded, that is a hierarchy. This kind of authority is key to hierarchy, but also to 
efficiency, something the Public House desperately needed in order to survive. The authors of 
the job descriptions, who included Sophia, understood that the ability for the pseudo-managers to 
act with autonomy was integral to a functioning, streamlined, efficient business. And they 
selflessly enacted change understanding what it might mean for their own positions.  
This move away from self-management to centralization and process was in part a move 
away from management that is flat, all-hands-in, heterogeneous, and arguably more democratic 
even if it was slow, at times inefficient, and capable of being co-opted or unduly influenced by 
agendas or personal conflicts.  
Whether the new structure can be re-done after the probation period remains to be seen. 
At the time of writing, decision-making power has remained consolidated on “behalf of the 
Board” (Board of Directors). The Workers Collective moved toward more bureaucracy in the 
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form of record keeping, log keeping, and reporting, and shifted away from mutual monitoring to 
a transcription of practices.  
Time management is one example of this move. Lucas sent out an email directing 
bartenders to clock in and out (“Time Clock”). The punch card system is a direct carryover from 
Taylorist regulations and control the use of employees’ time, with the employee allowed to work 
as needed and as the manager determines (Longo 2000; Rinehart 2006; Winsor 1996; Zuboff 
1988). At IEM, employees were expected to give a certain amount of hours but were in control 
of when they came in (Billeaux et al. 2011). IEM is a manufacturing plant and not a consumer 
cooperative. However, in a bar, when a worker doesn’t show up on time, another worker is 
forced to stay beyond their shift to cover for it, despite Front-of-the-House and the Back-of-the-
House having control of their own labor hours, self-record, and report, and have flexibility 
(Board of Directors). This imbalance in management was previously unheard of when even a 
code of conduct was met with resistance. Of this resistance to process, Robert said, 
Sometimes you’d have people who were staunchly anti-process being like okay 
I’ll be on that committee. Sure. They ended up stifling any progress, so it was like 
they would give us an inch and we would take it and run with it and it would die 
because we didn’t have critical mass to have anyone follow through with it. So 
that happened with HR policies, with finance policies, a lot of which some people 
spent a lot of time spending energy into writing budgets and some calendars and 
writing policy and it never really became something that got taken up or the 
committee dissolved or nobody was showing up any more or people would stop 
responding to email, or come to the meeting when we had a final draft. It was 
exhausting.  
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While the “anti-process,” DIY, anarchist culture dominated the Public House prior to the 
financial meltdown, the focus shifted to support process, managerial oversight, and discipline. 
The movement to greater time regulation and recordkeeping of employee movements came to be 
seen as a response to the lack of trust, the feeling of “taking advantage of” the ease of the Public 
House’s culture. 
 
Post-Mortem 
Herein lies the difficulty: without more accurate record keeping, the Public House may have 
ceased to exist. The move away from collectivism was not a political maneuver by a few power 
hungry individuals, but actions taken by people who wanted to keep the doors open for business. 
The narrative included phrases like:  
 “It’s for the good of the Public House.”  
 “We believe in this place and we want it to survive, so we have to do whatever is 
necessary to keep it open.” 
These two lines could justify a drastic action that the rest of the Board supports, and if good 
people are on the Board who are genuinely concerned with the wellbeing and survival of the 
Public House it may not be bad. After all, the Board is elected to do that very thing.  
Nevertheless, as was the case before the change in management, there was no mechanism 
in place for stalling one strong group of people or co-opting the process for an agenda. In a group 
of people who viewed themselves as dedicated to the mission of Public House, educated about 
cooperatives and cooperative development, involved in the process, the chance for manipulation 
was lessened. However, if those same people can be convinced that a drastic action is necessary, 
the Board could move with swiftness and unanimity, possibly into a direction that is not in line 
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with the mission. 
The movement away from a collectivist approach toward a managerial approach could be 
viewed as counter to the bylaws, a matter of interpretation. At the time, it was viewed as a 
necessary emergency move. At the Annual General Meeting, two individuals spoke openly about 
the move away from collectivism as a necessary move in order to save the bar. At another time, 
when concerns were brought up on whether or not what the Board was instating meshed with the 
bylaws, the response was that the bylaws vaguely state the Board was being true to the values of 
the Workers Collective. The over-arching narrative had to be maintained, even while being re-
written. 
One could view the move away from collectivism as a move toward what is easier: a 
standard managerial structure. It is far more difficult to be a collective, to find solutions that do 
not turn centralization of power and control into the hands of a trained, responsible few. It is not 
clear if the Public House had the means or time to find those solutions. Looking at the financial 
reports, the human resources reports, the morale of the bar, one could argue it was the necessary, 
inevitable thing to do when mutual monitoring and self-regulation failed.   
So is this a story about how collectivism failed? I would argue it’s a story about how a 
large group of people came together to save their co-op, even if it meant some folks losing their 
jobs and some of the control they had over their work. I would also argue it is a story still being 
written. 
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Chapter 5: Implications for Future Research 
Chapters 1 and 2 laid the foundation of my study, providing a literature review, 
introducing cooperatives as relevant to professional communication, and presenting the 
methodologies and methods I used in this project, namely, why actor-network theory and genre 
theory were the most relevant frameworks for analysis. In Chapters 3 and 4, I examined the 
relationships that underpinned genres in the Public House networks, the impact of textual 
practice on their values, and the process of change that occurred as tensions came to a head. In 
this final chapter, I return to the issue of cooperative development from the lenses of the 
cooperative scholars covered earlier to posit tangible recommendations for relevant fields of 
study. Recommendations fall into three categories: implications for genre and actor-network 
theory, cooperative development, and professional communication. 
 
Implications for Actor-Network and Genre Theory 
My study suggests cooperatives are fertile ground for new applications of genre and actor-
network theory. This past summer, a colleague and I published an article in which we drew from 
my application of actor-network theory to the Public House’s Board of Directors to discover 
ways researchers and practitioners could use actor-network theory in nonprofit board governance 
research. We suggested actor-network theory as a way of “opening the black box of 
governance.”  
In order to dismantle and examine power relations inside and outside the 
boardroom—in other words, to open the black box of governance politicking, 
power struggle, and actual board behavior and decision making—we may need to 
go beyond the established framework and images and begin to pull in alternative 
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views and ideas to better comprehend questions such as who really governs. One 
such alternate perspective is the concept of the dominant coalition… but while the 
dominant coalition lens provides an alternative entry point, we must also examine 
the issue from multiple perspectives… One such perspective that brings useful 
insights to the study of dominant coalitions (as well as nonprofit governance) is 
actor-network theory (ANT). (Andersson and Edenfield 2) 
Our research pointed to the usefulness of actor-network theory in understanding board relations, 
that is, rather than viewing the board as a unified body, actor-network theory provided us a 
framework to understand the discrete facets of the governance process. Particularly suitable for 
unpacking board governance because of its flattened nature, actor-network theory is also a 
radical shift from approaches solely focused on the human element as central to governance. 
Actor-network theory offers researchers and practitioners a way to account for all aspects of the 
governance process including nonhuman elements like texts, disease, physical space, etc., and 
for the shifting enrollments and allegiances characteristic of governance. 
In addition to actor-network theory, this study suggests important findings for genre 
theory, underscoring the importance of understanding not only who writes texts, but also who 
interprets them, for that interpretation can have widespread and lasting implications on the 
organization. To date, genre theory has not yet explored strategic ambiguity and its effects, 
particularly in horizontal organizations. My research suggests genre studies should look more 
closely at the political implications of strategic ambiguity in documentation and in governance. 
In the case of the Public House, ambiguity was an often-used strategy of cohesion and 
coordinated action; however, this ambiguity also allowed broad interpretation, precipitating a 
need for a “normed” interpretation not everyone had access to or could participate in, ultimately 
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undermining values of democratic participation and, eventually, the business itself. What may be 
of interest for genre theorists in professional communication is how strategic ambiguity can be 
used to enable and constrain participants in organization documentation. 
In 1984, Eric M. Eisenberg identified ambiguity as a strategy in organizational 
communication: “People in organizations confront multiple situational requirements, develop 
multiple and often conflicting goals, and respond with communicative strategies which do not 
always minimize ambiguity, but may be nonetheless effective” (228). He goes on to say, “When 
communicating with close friends, incomplete phrases and vague references may engender high 
degrees of clarity… the same message strategies applied in less close relationships may lead to 
confusion and ambiguity” (230). Applied to the Public House’s earliest genres, messages that 
were incomplete or ambiguous were clear to the original writers, friends, and neighbors with 
shared context and culture. In addition, as Sean pointed out, his sticky note organizing tool 
“helped to—I think—pull everybody together.” Eisenberg states this cohesion is exactly the 
point: organizational documents are ambiguous in order to encourage multiple perspectives and 
to respect different interpretations of organization documents, especially in mission documents.  
Strategic ambiguity fosters multiple viewpoints in organizations. This use of 
ambiguity is commonly found in organizational missions, goals, and plans… 
Strategic ambiguity is essential to organizing because it allows for multiple 
interpretations to exist among people who contend that they are attending to the 
same message… It is a political necessity to engage in strategic ambiguity so that 
different constituent groups may apply different interpretations… (231) 
Applying Eisenberg’s insights of ambiguity in organizational writing to the Public House shows 
that the ambiguity of documents like the Manifesto, mission statement, and bylaws was a 
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strategy, whether intentional or not, to “allow for multiple interpretations” to support coordinated 
activity of heterogeneous groups, promoting “unified diversity” (230).  
Nevertheless, this strategy was shortsighted because as workers and volunteers left and 
were replaced, people were less united around an interpretation. For example, in the case of the 
bylaws, to someone outside of the writing process or even the culture of Public House, the 
phrasing of the first article of the first bylaw is unclear as a mission statement.   
…to uphold cooperative standards of democracy, equality, self-responsibility, 
equity and solidarity and strives to operate in accordance with the values of 
collective worker management, living wages, strong community involvement, 
safe environment, responsible drinking and local products… 
The article does not define what “cooperative standards” and “values of collective worker 
management” mean. Words that are fraught and/or contentious in many contexts enable and even 
encourage multiple interpretations among members and reflect disparate views among the 
writers of the documents. These multiple interpretations are, in part, responsible for the 
showdown between the two philosophical positions of process and self-management.  
Importantly, scholars have expressed concern that textual ambiguity can lead to ethical 
ambiguity (Eisenberg and Goodall 1993; Paul and Strbiak 1999). While the results of my 
research point to the necessity of ambiguity in uniting diverse viewpoints for organized action in 
the beginning, ambiguity also created ethical dilemmas. For instance, the Board initially flagged 
a bylaw revision as necessary, but bylaws were in fact not changed or updated to reflect the 
change in structure. Instead, participants reinterpreted the bylaw to justify the change. The 
potential ethical and legal issues of this kind of ambiguity are troublesome. On the other hand, 
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the ability to pivot quickly enabled fast response to the crisis at hand, contributing to solvency 
and creating/maintaining jobs in the neighborhood.  
Without hierarchy or structural mechanisms that guide the interpretive process, ambiguity 
will result, perhaps necessarily. Clarity may require a centralized viewpoint not possible in a 
direct democracy. The kinds of negotiation embodied in the Public House genres may be an 
inevitable part of a horizontal business.  
Nevertheless, I believe my study points to the potential pitfalls of ambiguity in 
governance genres within a cooperative. Ambiguity as a compromise between incommensurable 
positions certainly led to a clash from which many businesses may not have survived. Genre 
studies has not yet studied this kind of political and textual complexity in a flattened 
organization, but given the meteoric rise of the cooperative and collective, this may be fertile 
ground for exploration.  
 
Implications for Cooperative Development 
Cooperative development has benefited from many fields of study including geography, 
urban studies, and nonprofit administration, but professional communication scholarship has yet 
to examine the varied landscape of community-owned workspaces. My study suggests the 
following for cooperative development and developers: pay attention to how cooperative 
documentation is written, the effects of scale on that documentation, and whether that 
documentation supports or undermines the co-op’s values.  
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Effects of Documentation on Democratic Practice 
According to cooperative scholars and practitioners, the cornerstone of a cooperative is 
democratic control, the “one person, one vote” principle (Zeuli and Cropp 45; see also Cheney 
1995; Murphy 2011; Riverwest Public House Cooperative Bylaws 2011). My study suggests 
there is a correlation between control of the cooperative and access to documentation. 
Cooperative founders and developers need to pay close attention to how they write documents, 
who has access to the writing, revision, and reading of those documents, and whether or not the 
documentation they produce reflects their value of democratic control.   
In Chapter 1, I argued that without the bureaucratic structure of a hierarchy, social 
practice created the conditions for power that become embedded in organizational genres 
(Arendt 1961; Freeman 1970). Use of strategic ambiguity in writing the Manifesto not only 
created the conditions for coordinated action, but also (necessarily) failed to fully resolve the 
philosophical differences between the founders. Rather, the Manifesto suspended the divisions 
for the moment in order to complete the required tasks: getting paperwork in order, filing forms 
with the city, obtaining licenses, finding member-investors, writing necessary bylaws, and other 
tasks essential to opening the cooperative. In addition, because of its ambiguity and intentional 
omission of process and procedures—deemed too controversial by the incommensurable 
factions—the Manifesto reified a practice of norming rather than transcribing process, a practice 
that took place among friends and was exclusionary, ultimately undermining principles of 
collective management. A reliance on norming through authorized interpretation enabled 
unauthorized exertions of power. Zeuli and Cropp describe worker collective management as 
“managed by the entire membership instead of a select membership team… a flat management 
structure rather than a hierarchal one” (37). However, because of the way some documentation 
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was written and interpreted by the group, in practice, only a select team could manage, creating 
tensions between stated principles and practice.  
While the omission was crucial to coordinated action at the time, it also set a precedent 
that continued even as the cooperative grew in size, effectively constraining access for new 
actors.  
 
Effects of Scale on Management Practice 
In the case of cooperatives, the success of a system seems directly connected to the scale 
of operations. Tactics that work for a small-scale organization like San Francisco’s Other 
Avenues Cooperative with 22 employees would not work for another cooperative in the same 
city with almost 300 employees, Rainbow Cooperative. What worked for Public House with six 
employees did not work when that staff was doubled, when more and more people came to rely 
on the materiality of the business. In the beginning, the tight-knit group of founders, however 
heterogeneous their philosophies, were able to come to agreement through informal, unwritten 
rules, to socially manage the organization, and to rely on informal practices like mutual 
monitoring (Billeaux et al. 2011; Polletta 2002). However, as the business grew and founders left 
and were replaced by newcomers (and a lot of them), strategies that worked in the past strained 
to keep up.  
When scale increases (or decreases), needs change and writing strategies must also 
change. Williams, Young-Hyman, and Cheney have each addressed the issue of scale and the 
ways various cooperatives come to deal with it. Young-Hyman’s investigation of Union Cab 
reveals that, as in the case of Public House, reorganization was necessary as scale increased 
(2013). Tulais at Other Avenues Cooperatives revealed that their Board of Directors consciously 
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decided to stay small in scope in order to exert greater control at the worker level and to allow 
for idiosyncratic, emergent practices (personal correspondence). Williams and Cheney have 
examined the issue of scale and considered the democratic challenges an expanding cooperative 
could face (Cheney 1995; Williams 2007).  
 I recommend that cooperatives fully recognize scale as a condition when writing 
organization documents, particularly within procedural and governing genres. While resolving 
differences can risk stultification, ignoring or writing in ambiguity as a way of moving forward 
from those differences does not eliminate and only delays them, simultaneously creating the need 
for norms and narratives to address what has gone unprinted. As in the case of the Public House 
and Union Cab, as scale increases, documentation that may have once been adequate needed to 
be rewritten for changing networks.  
 
Implications for Professional Communication Research 
My research represents one of the first attempts to critically examine a cooperative 
through the professional communication lens. So what can we learn from them and how can we 
help cooperatives succeed?   
 
Tension as a Condition for Innovation 
Professional communication theories can learn from how worker cooperatives are able to 
capitalize successfully on tensions that could stymie a business and how cooperators employ 
these tensions as a source of innovation and creativity. The longevity of the cooperative model 
has proven that they have calculated ways to capitalize on these tensions, as those who do not 
successfully navigate these conflicts eventually close their doors.   
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Research by Winsor, Longo, Clark, and Zachry have explored the relationship between 
genres, power, and hierarchy, but current scholarship does not yet account for this nuanced 
communication/productivity relationship. Research into worker cooperatives could be productive 
as the complexity in communication in this kind of horizontal organization invites political and 
social connections to direct the practices and even the ethos of the business. It is also productive 
because, to be sustainable, these group agreements enable a cooperative structure to evolve as 
needed while capitalizing on social ties in the community. For example, if a business begins to 
falter, stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process, expediting corrective action.  
 
Professional Communication Support for Cooperative Research 
Below I look at three areas for application of professional communication concepts in 
worker collective research: project management, genre theory, and productivity.  
First, further research on cooperatives might include an examination of project 
management in a worker cooperative. IEM has demonstrated great success with their project 
management strategies, handling multi-million dollar engineering projects and thousands of 
billable hours. They negotiate project management on a large scale while maintaining a 
commitment to flat management and group agreement (Billeaux et al. 8-9). Previous research on 
collaboration might bring an examination of the success of compromise and problem solving in 
manufacturing and technical cooperatives where a heterogeneous, flat team accomplishes a 
highly technical task over a long period.  
Secondly, researchers may analyze the role of genres in a cooperative as this relationship 
of power and texts can shed light on how genres are stabilized and constrained over time in a 
highly social, relatively unstable group. Distributed cognition is an approach to genres that may 
131 
enable a social analysis of genres in the worker cooperative. Distributed cognition is cognition 
distributed across different people who enable each other’s work, who “supplement and support” 
it (Winsor “Learning” 15), a concept highly applicable to worker cooperatives in which large 
groups of people rely on communication to make informed decisions. Distributed cognition 
approaches thinking as an act that takes place not completely inside an individual’s head, but 
“that is distributed among the individual, other people, the physical environment, and the tools 
the person uses, including language and such language structures as genres” (Winsor “Learning” 
6). Stabilized-for-now genres are fundamental in systems of distributed cognition, which Winsor 
advocates are the rule in workplaces, rather than the exception (Winsor “Learning” 5).   
The process by which texts become generic and stabilized in a cooperative is a rich 
example of distributed cognition. In Bitzer’s terms, texts respond to a rhetorical situation and 
because these situations are repeated, a rhetorical response draws on the previous text, and a 
generic text is developed: “Each text draws on previous texts written in response to similar 
situations. Through such interaction of texts, genres evolve as recurring” (Devitt 338; Miller 
1984). A text is understood as generic because they can be applied to multiple situations (e.g., 
employee codes of conduct or handbooks). These generic texts stabilize relationships and 
regulate the actions of heterogeneous groups so they can work together (Winsor "Using” 3). 
Because they are stable representations that people use to regulate each other, nowhere is this 
feature more important than in the complex communication practices at the site of a worker 
cooperative.  
 Thirdly, the important dialectic between power, communication, and productivity merits 
further research. A worker cooperative is a key site to study this dynamic as some research 
suggests worker cooperatives may outperform conventional enterprises (Craig and Pencavel, 
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1995; Murphy, 2011; Williams, 2007). Logue and Yates suggested as much in their study on 
worker cooperatives where they established that the strength of worker cooperatives lies not in 
the ownership model per se, but in participation and communication about finances, training, and 
cultural changes (2001). Craig and Pencavel underlined the importance of communication and 
agency in productivity: “worker-owners are more likely to be much better informed about 
actions taken by managers than are non-worker-owners” (124). A better understanding of this 
connection might potentially add to not only professional communication theories of effective 
communication in the workplace, but also pedagogy, and organization and management research.  
Finally, this research provides an opportunity to intersect professional communication 
and social justice. In the case of my research site, Milwaukee is an intensely segregated city 
fraught with a range of looming social issues including rampant violence, police brutality, and 
poverty. In similar cities, cooperatives have been at the epicenter of social change. To study 
communication at such a site prompts questions about the potential of this kind a business: can 
joint ownership contribute to the transformation of a community? If so, what role could 
university/community partnerships play in that transformation? 
 
Conclusion 
Looking forward, many questions remain. I look forward to expanding my rhetorical 
analysis to include more cooperatives, particularly worker cooperatives, with an eye toward 
making a substantial contribution of connecting professional communication research with the 
cooperative model, and demonstrating to cooperatives the importance of rhetoric, especially 
when writing documents. Two cooperatives I am interested in working with are the prisoner’s 
cooperative in Puerto Rico and a trans Latina beauty shop in Queens, New York.  
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What has been called “the world’s first prisoner cooperative” (Nzinga Ifateyo 2015), the 
Cooperativa de Servicios ARIGOS commodifies prisoners’ artwork. Importantly, the cooperative 
has been successful at reducing recidivism and has been linked to helping prisoners in a way that 
traditional means have failed:  
Through working with the art, a more important change took place—the inmates 
changed themselves through constructive and satisfying work. “We started to 
change the way we saw the world,” Rodriguez said. “It ended up transforming our 
lives practically without us noticing… It was important for us because it allowed 
us to be in contact with our community. This became part of our rehabilitation 
process.” (Nzinga Ifateyo, 2015) 
I would like to take a closer look at the connection between cooperation and rehabilitation by 
tracing the texts they created and used through the process. I believe that doing so not only 
supports the work they are already doing, but also contributes to one major question being asked 
of the professional communication field: how can we move from talking about social justice to 
enacting it?   
In a similar vein, another cooperative I would like to examine more critically is a new 
trans Latina women’s cooperative in New York City. Dekimpe writes, “Their business, the first 
of its kind in New York City, aims to provide stable and dignified jobs for the women and to 
serve as a model to other transgender workers who have faced employment discrimination.” This 
cooperative was founded in part to help trans women have meaningful, dignified work. Dekimpe 
writes, 
A 2013 Make the Road survey of the LGBTQ community in Manhattan and 
Queens found transgender and gender non-conforming individuals face the 
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highest rates of unemployment among those surveyed. Forty-three percent of 
transgender respondents said they were looking for a job; 40 percent said they had 
experienced some form of discrimination based on their gender identity when 
being considered for a job or promotion; and 44 percent said they had been forced 
to quit a job because of discrimination they endured in the workplace. (2015) 
Faced with such staggering statistics, the need for support is profound. As with Cooperativa de 
Servicios ARIGOS, this cooperative is responding to a true, deep human need. Collaborating 
with this kind of cooperative and supporting their work either through my own research or 
through service-learning projects with students may contribute to their long-term success.  
The trans Latina beauty shop is set in a backdrop of a larger cultural turn toward 
cooperation, sharing, and bartering as economic alternatives to capitalism. In 2014, New York 
City Mayor Bill de Blasio allocated a “historic $1.2 million initiative to fund the development of 
worker cooperatives” (“New York City Invests $1.2 Million in Worker Cooperatives”). 
Similarly, in Cleveland, Ohio; Jackson, Mississippi; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and all over the 
country, administrators are turning toward worker cooperatives as a way of revitalizing areas and 
providing human services in a fiscally conservative way. As such, I believe my research on the 
role of rhetoric in cooperatives will support economic development, and begin to bridge the 
divide between talking about social justice and enacting it.  
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Appendix 
Interview Questions 
 
1. What can these negotiations teach us about productivity and power among workers 
in smaller, loosely structured work groups?  
 
If there are any, who are the heavy lifters at the RWPH? Why do you think they are in that 
position? Do you think it helps or hurts the collective management structure of the workers 
collective? 
 
Are you content with the present structure of the workers collective?  
 
What is the relationship, if any, between the present structure and your own productivity? Do 
you feel more productive or less? 
 
Would you say the structure of the workers collective is formal or informal? Would one way 
work better than another?  
 
Have there been times you personally felt the collective management structure failed or was in 
danger of failing? If so, describe that situation.  
 
Have there been times you wished the collective management structure was something different? 
If so, describe the situation and what you would like to have been different. 
 
 
2. What can collective management teach us about flexibility and appropriation of 
workplace genres?  
 
What are the most common tools you use to communicate? What is the most popular tool to use 
for the group?  
 
How effective do you think the communication tools you and other workers use are in 
communicating about business matters? 
 
How often do you refer back to cooperative documents (handbooks, job descriptions, bylaws, 
emails, meeting notes, etc.) to figure out what to do, or what is expected of you? When you do, 
what are you trying to do? How do the texts help you?  
 
What’s best about workplace communication here? 
 
What ways does communication sometimes fail or break down? 
 
How do you think you use cooperative texts to complete your work tasks? 
 
Name an instance where communication broke down. Why do you think it happened? 
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3. How does the rhetoric of empowerment shape/become shaped by the Collective? 
 
Describe the power a worker has at the Public House.  
 
Looking back on your experiences of work at the Public House or other jobs, how have you felt 
the collective management structure empowered you? Can you give an example? 
 
How has it disempowered you?  
 
What, if anything, have you given up by not having a manager or conventional business 
structure?  
 
What, if any, are the connections between management types and worker participation or sense 
of ownership? 
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